Regulating the Influence Game in Australia

In this research note we describe the introduction and evolution of Australia's approach to regulating lobbyists. We examine how the lobbying regulations in place across Australia today compare with each other, as well as with lobbying regulations in some other countries around the world. The regulations in each Australian jurisdiction are classified according to their characteristics, providing insights into their commonalities and differences.     

The ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Political Economy of Hedge Fund Regulation in the European Union

The traditional literature on interest group behaviour presumes that private interests develop lobbying strategies based on the principle of effective allocation of resources. However, nearly 400 private interest groups actively lobby the Council of Europe, a classical intergovernmental organisation with weak decision-making powers, where no significant policy pay-off is expected to occur. This analysis aims to explain the seeming puzzle of private interest groups seeking to influence an institution which is generally perceived as having no strong decision-making powers in European political space. It does so by exploring three explanations from the existing literature, namely ‘policy overlap’, ‘venue shopping’ and ‘epistemic community’, and considers another explanation not hitherto fully developed, suggesting that the ‘ideological motivation’ of interest groups helps to explain their behaviour. Taking the ideological motivation of interest groups into account when analysing lobbying strategies can in fact shed light on certain lobbying preferences that would otherwise appear to defy the logic of interest representation. This paper therefore suggests that an ‘ideological motivation’ explanation potentially plays a crucial role in the analysis of the behaviour of any interest group.     

Regulating Australia's lobbyists: coming full circle to promote democracy?

• This paper initially examines the history and evolution of lobbying regulations in Australia at both the federal and state levels. This examination is conducted in a comparative context, setting the codes of conduct in place in various Australian jurisdictions against each other, as well as against the lobbying regulations in place in other countries around the world. Based upon this approach, the regulations in each Australian jurisdiction are classified according to their characteristics, providing insights into their commonalities and differences. Thereafter, we examine the attitudes of Australian politicians, administrators and lobbyists, at both the federal and state levels, towards the regulations they have to abide by.

Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.