试论我国行政登记制度及其立法完善

我国行政登记制度存在严重缺陷 ,突出表现在行政登记机关的登记审查批准权很大 ,几乎不受什么制约 ,但却不承担相应的义务和责任 ;行政登记没有明确的公信力。在我国加入WTO后 ,应和海外立法接轨 ,明确特定行政登记的公信力和国家责任 ,健全和完善我国的行政登记制度。     

船舶碰撞造成油污损害民事赔偿责任的承担

本文总结了我国司法实践中在处理船舶碰撞油污损害赔偿方面存在的主要法律问题 ,并根据法理和有关法律规定对这些问题进行了较详细分析 ,最后在分析基础上提出解决这些的立法或司法建议案     

公安工作要全面创新发展

十六大的创新理论必将公安工作带入全面创新发展的历史阶段。我们至少要从六个方面推动公安工作全面创新发展,即树立创新观念,学会创新思维,培养创新能力,营造创新环境,建立创新的体制、机制和制度,应用创新的科技。     

跨行政区生态环境协同治理绩效问责模式及实践情境 ——基于国内外典型案例的分析

探索跨行政区生态环境协同治理绩效问责的有效模式,对推动我国跨行政区生态环境的良好治理具有重要意义.制度分析与发展框架(IAD)下的行动情境核心分析要素和目标管理理论,为分析跨行政区生态环境协同治理绩效问责过程提供了新视角.通过应用由制度规则、责任主体、协同执行、结果评估、绩效反馈五个要素构成的分析框架,对国内外典型生态治理案例开展分析,可以归纳国内外跨行政区生态环境协同治理绩效问责的基本模式.研究发现,每一个具体的绩效问责模式都有其特定的问责情境、前提条件和制约因素.因此,在特定问责情境中的跨行政区生态环境协同治理绩效问责具有多元化的路径模式与结果形态,对绩效问责模式的选择不能脱离其特定的情境和场域.     

The August 1924 raid on Stolpce,Poland, and the evolution of Soviet active intelligence

In August 1924, a Soviet-sponsored raid on the Polish town of Stolpce to free two imprisoned communist activists went badly wrong. Though the ruling Politburo had not authorized this raid, the public embarrassment and diplomatic consequences led the Soviet government to overhaul its program of ‘active intelligence’, halting peacetime attacks on neighboring states in favor of quieter preparations for wartime sabotage and diversion under the authority of the Red Army's Intelligence Directorate. At the same time, the Politburo organized stay-behind groups in Soviet border regions to prepare for the possibility of enemy occupation.     

跨行政区生态环境协同治理绩效问责机制构建与应用——基于目标管理过程的分析框架

问责目标的整体性、问责过程的有序性以及问责标准的统一性是跨行政区生态环境协同治理绩效问责机制的根本特性.基于目标管理过程分析框架,以整体性绩效责任目标的实现为中心,构建了包括绩效责任目标确定、目标执行、目标评估、目标反馈和目标改进五个环节的跨行政区生态环境协同治理绩效问责机制基本框架.通过对京津冀地区进行应用检验,证实...     

The International Monetary Fund: A review of the recent evidence

A review of recent quantitative studies on the International Monetary Fund reveals that much of the conventional wisdom is incorrect. Recent studies have demonstrated a new degree of methodological rigor, have drawn more heavily upon insights from political science, and have asked a number of new questions. We review studies of participation in IMF programs, design of IMF conditionality, implementation and enforcement of IMF conditions, conventional program effects and catalytic effects. At every stage, we find substantial evidence of the influence of major IMF shareholders, of the Fund’s own organizational imperatives, and of domestic politics within borrowing countries. We conclude that very little is known with certainty about the effects of IMF lending, but that a great deal has been learned about the mechanics of IMF programs that will have to be taken into account in order to obtain unbiased estimates of those effects.