Selbstentfesselung in kleinen Schritten? Deutschlands Außenpolitik zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts

Ohne Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag wurde bereits Anfang Januar 2003 abgeschlossen und konnte bis Mitte Februar nur noch geringfügig erg?nzt werden. Der Verfasser ist Herrn Fariborz Zelli, M.A., für seine Mithilfe bei der Vorbereitung dieses Essays zu gro?em Dank verpflichtet.     

Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks

European regulatory networks (ERNs) play a central role in the formulation, deliberation, and implementation of EU policies and have, thus, become objects of investigation in a fast‐growing scholarly literature. We identify two shortcomings – one conceptual, one theoretical – in the literature on ERNs: First, we argue that the principal–agent approach, which is conventionally used to conceptualize ERNs, overlooks and even misrepresents central features of ERNs. By introducing and applying the “orchestration” framework to ERNs we demonstrate that it better captures the specific characteristics of ERNs. Secondly, explanations for the choice and design of ERNs have treated functional and power‐based accounts as mutually exclusive. We argue instead that explanatory leverage can be gained by combining these two accounts by specifying their respective domains of application. While functional accounts enable us to illuminate why and under what circumstances ERNs are created in the first place (rather than EU agencies or delegation to the Commission), political accounts help us to shed light on variation in the design of ERNs (i.e. why actors opt for rather close or loose network structures). We illustrate the explanatory value‐added of such an approach through two brief case studies on EU telecommunications and competition policies.     

Credibility,Complexity and Uncertainty: Explaining the Institutional Independence of 29 EU Agencies

The delegation of policy-making tasks to EU agencies and their remarkable growth in number over the past two decades mark a striking new development in the EU's institutional make-up. While most of the nascent literature on the EU's ‘agencification’ addresses the conditions for agency creation and the implications of agency governance from the perspective of democratic accountability, there is a lack of empirical research systematically scrutinising the institutional structure and degree of formal-institutional independence of these agencies. This article offers a comprehensive empirical assessment and measure of the variation in institutional independence displayed by the entire set of 29 EU agencies operating under the EU's three pillars and tests hypotheses explaining variation in formal independence among agencies.     

Productivity Growth and the Political Economy of Social Security

The present paper provides an analysis of unfunded social securityas the outcome of a public decision making process in an endogenousgrowth economy. It employs a model in which there is a non-monotonic relationship beween productivity growth and the scale ofpublic intergenerational redistribution. The paper shows thatalthough unfunded social security need not harm growth in general,it is likely to harm growth in a democracy. This effect isreinforced by population aging.     

Old wine in new bottles? The Commission and the use of environmental policy instruments

In this article, we address two main questions. First, we ask whether the alleged shift in the Commission's environmental 'policy style' from a traditional regulatory style towards a new style based on less impositional, more market-based and co-operative instruments has actually occurred in practice. We seek to answer this question (a) by employing content analysis to assess the policy instruments propagated by the Commission in both the Fourth and Fifth Environmental Action Programmes (EAP); and (b) by analysing legislative proposals introduced by the Commission in designated environmental policy fields (atmospheric pollution, waste, water). On the basis of the findings we argue that there is a discrepancy between what the Commission declares in the EAPs and what it proposes in practice. Moreover, in a second step, we highlight the factors which might make any major shift in the Commission's policy style difficult to achieve in order to account for this discrepancy.     

Toward a Stronger Socialism

正The upcoming 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China(CPC) will be inscribed as an especially historic event.The congress will further emphasize and clarify the principles and policies that have already been clearly stated by the Party.Led by the CPC,     

Secrecy in Europe

Abstract

This article introduces a collection of papers devoted to the study of secrecy in European politics across a range of EU and national settings and policy domains. Academic interest in secret politics – those aspects of public activity intentionally concealed from the public eye – and the governance of secrecy – the political processes and regulatory frameworks governing secret keeping – is growing. This interest reflects technological, social and political developments that appear to signal the end of privacy and the rapid expansion of political secrecy in European multi-level settings. As a consequence, the tensions between democratic accountability, with its transparency requirements, and political secrecy, which is typically justified on grounds of effectiveness of state action, have become more marked and more politicised. Engaging with these developments, the contributions to this collection draw on actor- and interest-centred perspectives that focus on actors’ motivations in secret politics; institutional perspectives that focus on contestation over secrecy norms; and organisational perspectives that emphasise the diversity of secrecy cultures. Further research will benefit from paying special attention to a diverse range of inter-institutional and inter-organisational secrecy settings; to political contestation over secrecy and the regulatory regimes that govern it; and to the refashioning of public-private secrecy architectures.