PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND THE EVALUATION OF PARTICIPATORY INSTRUMENTS IN SPANISH CITIES

The article examines the role that personal experience with participatory mechanisms plays in the explanation of the perceived efficacy of these instruments. The first part demonstrates that , contrary to most expectations, citizens who have direct experience with these processes have a more negative evaluation of their performance. Where does this frustration effect come from? The second part analyzes three potential explanations of why this pattern emerges: (1) overly high prior expectations; (2) the existence of an underdeveloped institutional participatory context; and (3) the design of participatory mechanisms. We use a public opinion survey representative of the Spanish adult population living in medium sized cities to test these hypotheses. Results show that participants' overly high expectations are not crucial. On the other hand, people who live in more participatory cities and those who participate in individually based mechanisms do not feel the same disappointment with participatory experiences.     

APPLICABILITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL NORMS

We analyse the relationship between applicability and effectiveness of legal norms from a philosophical perspective. In particular, we distinguish between two concepts of applicability. The external applicability of norms refers to institutional duties; a norm N is externally applicable if and only if a judge is legally obliged to apply N to some case c. Internal applicability refers instead to the sphere of validity of legal norms. A norm N is internally applicable to actions regulated by its sphere of validity. We also explore the consequences of a thesis which maintains that applicability restricts the concept of effectiveness, so that only applicable norms can be considered effective. Our analysis illustrates that a proper reconstruction of the concept of applicability is of great importance not only for understanding the concept of effectiveness but also for providing insight into the nature of law.     

Coercion and justification: a global public reason perspective on Security Council reform

The Security Council is the only international body capable of authorizing the use of force in cases other than self-defence. Its main mission is to protect international peace and security, and this has been reinterpreted in recent decades to include the protection of human rights in situations of grave humanitarian emergencies as well as to allow it to exercise legislative powers. Given this extraordinary range of functions, it is worth asking whether the Security Council is justified in their exercise. Should the international community entrust such power to an institution with the authority, structure, and decision-making process of the Security Council? This article explores the implications of a distinctive tradition in political philosophy – namely, the public reason tradition – for judging the adequacy of some of the proposals for reform of the Security Council. I show that the scope of authority of the Security Council, as well as some of the proposals for reform, can be challenged on the basis of an emerging global public culture.     

ADMINISTRATIVE TRADITION AND REFORMS IN SPAIN: ADAPTATION VERSUS INNOVATION

The main purpose of this paper is understanding public administration formation and change in Spain. Its development before and since the years of Franco from 1939 to 1975, is noticeably path dependent in nature. As this paper will show, the foundations were laid before the Franco regime. Then came a period of political domination of the bureaucracy and the emergence of a key structural element of Spanish administration, the special corps. The paper covers the period of political transition, democratic consolidation, and the many processes of administrative reforms. These include the reforms of the Spanish civil service as well as the deep processes of reform.     

Some Remarks on the Notions of Legal Order and Legal System

Abstract
In this paper, the authors discuss some problems related to the existence and identity of legal norms and legal systems. Firstly, two criteria for identification of legal norms are analyzed: linguistic criteria and non-linguistic criteria. Secondly, the dynamics of legal systems and the distinction between legal system and legal order are examined (close to Raz's distinction between momentary legal system and legal system). Based on the logical relations of membership and inclusion, two ways of analysing the change of legal systems are suggested. Thirdly, a criterion for identification of legal orders (from Bulygin) is discussed and it is shown that this criterion does not explain adequately, on the one hand, the existence of some norms, i.e., customary norms; and, on the other, the existence of invalid norms; i.e., unconstitutional norms. The main conclusions of this paper are: (a) the concepts of legal system and legal order could not explain the existence of law in a given society; (b) the concepts of legal system and legal order could be considered models of rational normative systems.