Social welfare functions when preferences are convex,strictly monotonic,and continuous

The paper shows that if the class of admissible preference orderings is restricted in a manner appropriate for economic and political models, then Arrow's impossibility theorem for social welfare functions continues to be valid. Specifically if the space of alternatives is R ₊ ⁿ , n ≥ 3, where each dimension represents a different public good and if each person's preferences are restricted to be convex, continuous, and strictly monotonic, then no social welfare function exists that satisfies unanimity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and nondictatorship.     

Primary Voters Versus Caucus Goers and the Peripheral Motivations of Political Participation

Depending on their state of residence, Americans can participate in Presidential nomination contests either by voting in a primary or by attending a caucus. Since caucus participation requires more time and effort than primary voting, it has long been thought that caucuses must attract a more partisan, activist, and politically extreme cohort of citizens than primaries. This paper challenges the view that more burdensome electoral institutions necessarily ought to attract more politically engaged citizens. I propose a theory of peripheral motivations that predicts caucus goers and primary voters will not differ in terms of their political attitudes or interest, but they will differ in their levels of community engagement. The key insight is that many of the reasons why citizens choose to participate or abstain from politics actually have little to do with politics. Analysis of two surveys from the 2008 Presidential election substantiates the theoretical expectations.     

The Hybrid Terrorist Organization: Hezbollah as a Case Study

Since 1982, Hezbollah has evolved from a “revolutionary vanguard” terrorist organization bent on violently overthrowing the Lebanese government to a hybrid terrorist organization that uses legitimate political tools to the same end. Today Hezbollah operates on the civilian plane of da’wa, social welfare, and religious education; the military–Resistance plane (jihad); and the political plane. In its drive to dominate Shi’ite society, Hezbollah overcame its chief rival, Amal, and now plays a decisive role in Lebanon's political system and the Middle East. Understanding Hezbollah's emergence as a prototypical hybrid terrorist organization is key to understanding global and local jihad movements.     

Contextualizing Political Terrorism: A Collective Action Perspective for Understanding the Tanzim

An attempt is made to embed the study of political terrorism within the larger phenomenon of Collective Action. It is suggested that the analysis of dynamics within and between components of Collective Action—structure of conflict, a social movement, authorities, and contention—can be beneficial for gaining additional insights into the study of group risk for political terrorism. Using the case of the Tanzim contention with Israeli forces it is demonstrated how processes within, between, and outside the conflictants affected Tanzim members' decision to employ political terrorism. Based on the analysis, several implications for counterterrorism are offered.     

Long-term working memory in voice identification

Abstract

The present study investigated the role of long-term working memory in voice identification. For this purpose, a mock theft design was used and three groups: voice identification experts, totally blind people and a control group of sighted listeners without any special training or experience in voice identification, were compared for their voice identification efficiency.

Results revealed that the professional voice identification experts were more accurate than the other groups. Blind listeners were as effective as the sighted in voice identification. The results confirmed predictions which were based on the long-term working memory model. Implications of these results for the practice of voice identification are discussed.     

Hezbollah's Strategy of “Walking on the Edge”: Between Political Game and Political Violence

Since entering Lebanese politics in the 1990s, Hezbollah has defined itself as a political party that plays by the rules. Simultaneously, it has continued to use social assistance to win over Lebanon's Shi’ites while using violence to eliminate rivals. Through this strategy of “walking on the edge,” Hezbollah has metamorphosed from an illegitimate terrorist organization into a legitimate political party heading Lebanon's government. An International Tribunal's recent indictment of four senior Hezbollah officials for involvement in the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri provides an opportunity to understand how Hezbollah maintains this canny—and successful—balancing act.     

The effects of opportunities on insurgencies

There are several overlooked aspects of the 1987 Palestinian intifadah. This article focuses on its specific time context and offers an alternative theoretical framework for explaining it: the political process model. This model addresses the when question of social movements, and specifically, why it was that the Palestinian public participated at such an unprecedented level during the period of the intifadah. Comparison is made with collective behaviour and resource mobilization models.