Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of International Law

Born into the wider body of international law, the climate regime needs to be understood in light of preexisting regimes. By drawing on the current debate about fragmentation in international law, this article highlights challenges for international lawyers and policymakers in navigating the relationship between the climate regime and the biodiversity regime, and the relationship between the climate regime and the multilateral trading system. This article concludes that a narrow focus on conflicts misrepresents the multifaceted nature of climate change and precludes an adequate jurisprudential understanding of the relationship between the climate regime and other regimes. An improved understanding, particularly with respect to interactions with the biodiversity regime, requires a broadening of the debate that takes account of the institutional aspects of these relationships that may allow enhanced political cooperation and coordination. Further, international law, and in particular the emerging concept of systemic integration, has the potential to make a positive contribution to the climate‐trade interplay.     

Commission Newsletter: Spring 2010

SUMMARY

In this article, Francesco Soddu analyzes the role of the first chamber of the Italian parliament, the Senato, in the era of Giolitti's political dominance. The Senato was a nominated chamber, with members appointed from a prescribed list of categories by the king, and who held office for life. Its position in the constitution had been laid down in the Albertine statute of 1848. The author analyses the composition and working practices of the Senato and describes its function in the legislative process. He then looks for instructive similarities and differences between the Senato and the British House of Lords in the same period, when the Lords last became the focus of a major constitutional crisis over their composition and powers in 1909–11.     

Government alternation and legislative agenda setting

Recent studies of the legislative process have put forward a number of plausible hypotheses regarding the distribution of agenda‐setting power. These hypotheses have guided scholars in identifying those conflicts and actors that are crucial to explaining legislative change and the wording of legislation. However, this has not yet led to a better understanding of the choice of specific agenda‐setting rules. Why does the cabinet in some parliamentary democracies enjoy an undisputed role, while in others the parliament continues to play the role of co‐protagonist? This article attempts to answer this question by looking at some well‐known features of party systems. It is argued that in pivotal party systems, with limited government alternation, it is much more difficult to strengthen the government vis‐à‐vis the parliament. One factor prevents the procedural and institutional predominance of the cabinet under these circumstances: the lack of opportunities for, and expectations of, large and controversial policy change.     

Sharing the burden in a free riders’ land: The EU migration and asylum policy in the views of public opinion and politicians

New divisions have emerged within the European Union over the handling of the recent migration crisis. While both frontline and favoured destination countries are called upon to deal with the number of migrants looking for international protection and better living conditions, no consensus has been reached yet on the quota-based mechanisms for the relocation of refugees and financial help to exposed countries proposed by the EU. Such mechanisms pose a trade-off for member states: the EU's response to the crisis offers help to countries under pressure, but it inevitably requires burden-sharing among all EU members and a limitation of their national sovereignty. Within this scenario, the article compares how public opinion and political elites in ten different EU countries view a common EU migration policy grounded on solidarity and burden-sharing. By tracing both within- and cross-national patterns of convergence (and divergence), the article shows that contextual factors influence policy preferences, with support for solidarity measures being stronger in countries with higher shares of illegal migrants and asylum seekers. While individuals’ predispositions, identity and ideological orientations account for both masses’ and elites’ attitudes towards burden-sharing measures, subjective evaluations and beliefs concerning the severity of the crisis provide additional and alternative explanations when looking at the public's preferences. In particular, it is found that concern about the flow of migrants to Europe consolidates the impact of contextual factors, whereas the overestimation of the immigrant population fosters hostility against solidarity measures, with both effects more pronounced as the country's exposure to the crisis increases. In the light of these results, the main implication of this study is that EU institutions have to primarily address entrenched beliefs and misperceptions about immigrants to enhance public support for a joint approach to migration.     

Testing Structuralist and Interpretative Explanations of Policy Change: The Case of Italy's Budget Reform

This article compares the relative explanatory power of structuralist and interpretative approaches to the study of policy change. By assessing the fit of these approaches against the actual reform of the formulation, approval, and implementation stages of Italy's budget process in the 1990s, the article shows that structural factors (such as fiscal pressures and changes in the electoral rules) played a key role in the reform of the formulation stage but not in that of the approval and implementation stages, where the content of reform followed the managerialist paradigm endorsed by the Italian reform community. Italy in the 1990s was under considerable pressure to achieve fiscal retrenchment, and the managerialist paradigm advocated measures that were largely antithetical to those that can be deduced from the changes in institutional context. Thus, the Italian case provides an excellent opportunity to assess the relative causal impact of ideas and structure on reform.     

MECHANISMS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM: ITALIAN CASES OF BETTER REGULATION AND DIGITALIZATION

This article applies a processual approach to the explanation of administrative reform in Italy over fifteen years. By carrying out a comparison between better regulation and digitalization policies it shows that the oscillation in the level of implementation over time and across policies can be explained by the intensity and direction of spillover and certification mechanisms and that in turn these mechanisms are activated by design features and contextual factors at different levels of analysis.     

Rights, World-Society and the Crisis of Legal Universalism*

Abstract. The universalism of rights is a corollary to the individualistic semantics of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution. Paradoxically, the grounds of universalism were those legal and political concepts that theoretically describe the 19th century nation-state (such as sovereignty of the people, citizenship, rights, and the like). All these concepts of the liberal tradition construct the nation-state on the presupposition of a highly homogeneous political community of rational subjects, whose homogeneity consists in the very social, economic, political and sexual conditions of their rationality. This kind of legal and political semantics is no longer adequate to characterize contemporary society which is a multicultural, highly in-homogeneous world-society. It no longer incorporates an ethic which is able to enforce universal leading values for human action.     

The Italian Post War Fiscal Constitution: Reasons of a Failure

If the Italian Constitution shall be changed, to transform Italy in a semi-Presidential Republic-as in the project of constitutional revision recently approved by the Parliamentary Committee for Constitutional Reforms-the President of the Republic, elected by the people, shall become the natural guardian of the fiscal constitution, under direct control of the public opinion (17). He should, then, be staffed with an office, to check the conformity of laws to the fiscal constitutional rules and claims might be addressed by a qualified number of Parliamentarians, in addition to the Court of Accounts, to him. The chain connecting the President of the Republic to the Parliament, in this new constitutional model, will be broken. And hardly the President could stand still, in case of open violation of the rules of the fiscal constitution by the Government on the Parliament, because of the risk of loss of reputation. If he were to overlook negative checks by the Court of Accounts, his behaviour would greatly damage his credibility among the electors. Thus, it seems that the difference in the model of State, whether is a parliamentary system or a system where the President of the Republic is elected by the people, has much to do with the workability of a fiscal constitution aiming to monetary and fiscal soundness.