BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIVENESS: EFFECTS OF ELECTED GOVERNMENT,PUBLIC AGENDAS AND EUROPEAN ATTENTION ON THE UK BUREAUCRACY

What determines the bureaucratic agenda? This article combines insights from models of bureaucratic behaviour with agenda‐setting models of government attention to test the effects of elected government, public, and EU agendas on the bureaucratic agenda. Using time series cross‐sectional analyses of subject and ministry coded data on UK statutory instruments from 1987 to 2008, I find strong effects for both the elected government and EU legislative agendas on UK statutory instruments. Furthermore, by breaking the data into different sets based on their relationship with the EU, several logical differences in these effects are found. These results include the EU agenda having exclusive influence on instruments implementing EU directives, and the UK agenda being the sole driver of bureaucratic attention on those instruments that mention the EU but do not implement EU legislation. This article opens a new avenue for research on bureaucracy by approaching it as a unique policy‐making institution.     

HOME IS WHERE THE HEART IS: REFLECTIONS ON SOCIAL DEMOCRACY & NATIONALISM IN THE COMMON EUROPEAN HOME

That Assembly, since the destruction of the orders, has no fundamental law, no strict convention, no respected usage to restrain it…'fools rush in where angels fear to tread'. In such a state of unbounded power for undefined and undefinable purposes, the evil of a moral and almost physical inaptitude of the man to the function must be the greatest we can conceive to happen in the management of human affairs. ²     

WHAT’S MEASURED IS WHAT MATTERS: TARGETS AND GAMING IN THE ENGLISH PUBLIC HEALTH CARE SYSTEM

In the 2000s, governments in the UK, particularly in England, developed a system of governance of public services that combined targets with an element of terror. This has obvious parallels with the Soviet regime, which was initially successful but then collapsed. Assumptions underlying governance by targets represent synecdoche (taking a part to stand for a whole); and that problems of measurement and gaming do not matter. We examine the robustness of the regime of targets and terror to these assumptions using evidence from the English public health service on reported successes, problems of measurement, and gaming. Given this account, we consider the adequacy of current audit arrangements and ways of developing governance by targets in order to counter the problems we have identified.     

THE OMBUDSMAN IN BRITAIN: A QUALIFIED SUCCESS IN GOVERNMENT REFORM

The Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration has not been the dismal failure forecast by critics at the time the office was established in 1967. One alleged defect — not criticizing the substance of administrators' discretionary decisions — is characteristic to a large degree of other admired ombudsmen. Recruiting the Commissioner and his investigators from the civil service has not had expected harmful effects. On the other hand, the office has fallen short of the performance of other ombudsmen with regard to the public's access to the Commissioner (the MP filter), the efficiency of his investigative methods, and certain limitations on his jurisdiction. Failure so far to remove these defects appears to be the result of inadequate comparative research and analysis in support of reformers' proposals, the overly cautious and consensual style of civil service policy formulation, and opposition from members of existing institutions (MPS and the officers of civil service unions) who mistakenly believe that their complaint handling activities are threatened by proposed changes.