Strategic Competition in Sequential Election Contests

This paper studies a sequential election contest, such as theAmerican presidential primary, in which several electionsoccur one at a time until a single winner emerges. Theconventional wisdom is such a system benefits a candidatefavored in the initial elections because of momentum. Thispaper uncovers a potentially opposing force if participationis costly and candidates exit when they have unfavorablefuture prospects. A candidate with friendly elections at theend of the contest will typically benefit from the resultinggame theoretic competition.Tension between this strategic effect and momentum helpsexplain several empirical regularities of presidentialprimaries.     

The Effect of Mandatory Seat Belt Laws on Seat Belt Use by Socioeconomic Position

We investigated the differential effect of mandatory seat belt laws on seat belt use among socioeconomic subgroups. We identified the differential effect of legislation across higher versus lower education individuals using a difference‐in‐differences model based on state variations in the timing of the passage of laws. We find strong effects of mandatory seat belt laws for all education groups, but the effect is stronger for those with fewer years of education. In addition, we find that the differential effect by education is larger for mandatory seat belt laws with primary rather than secondary enforcement. Our results imply that existing socioeconomic differences in seat belt use would be further mitigated if all states upgraded to primary enforcement.     

Decentralisation and government provision of public goods: The public health sector in Uganda

While many developing countries have devolved health care responsibilities to local governments in recent years, no study has examined whether decentralisation actually leads to greater health sector allocative efficiency. This paper approaches this question by modeling local government budgeting decisions under decentralisation. The model leads to conclusions not all favourable to decentralisation and produces several testable hypotheses concerning local government spending choices. For a brief empirical test of the model we look at data from Uganda. The data are of a type seldom available to researchers–actual local government budgets for the health sector in a developing country. The health budgets are disaggregated into specific types of activities based on a subjective characterisation of each activity's ‘publicness’. The empirical results provide preliminary evidence that local government health planners are allocating declining proportions of their budgets to public goods activities.