ONE‐STOP SHOPS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE: THE ADAPTATION OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL FORM IN THREE COUNTRIES

In recent years welfare services in Western Europe have been criticized for poor coordination. In response, ‘seamlessness’ has emerged as a vision for public administration with ‘one‐stop shops' viewed as means to reach this. This article conceptualizes the one‐stop shop and presents a three country case study to examine its drivers and its adaptation. In all countries the reforms meant mergers driven by hopes for a single entrance to services as well as proximity to citizens. However, the analysis of task portfolios, participant structure, instruments and autonomy reveal important variations in the adaptations. The specific configurations of one‐stop shops that emerged were partially a product of compromises and negotiations influenced by the political and performance priorities of central government. The classical trade‐off between specialization and coordination persists, but by offering users ICT‐based services one can to some extent maintain specialization behind the frontline and still provide services that are coordinated from a user perspective.     

The Effects of Administrative Professionals on Contracting Out

An often-debated subject in the public administration literature concerns why some units contract out more than others. The present article decomposes the influence of public employees on municipal contracting as different types of employees have different skills and incentives and must be treated accordingly. First, the analysis shows that the apparent negative relationship between public employees in general and municipal contracting is partly reflecting the fact that the number of public employees is endogenous to contracting. Second, we suggest that administrative professionals and not bureaucrats in general have a positive impact on contracting. This is because administrative professional skills are vital for carrying out a tender and because contracting is essentially a part of administrative professionals' bureau-shaping interests. Finally, we find support for two often-discussed claims in the literature, namely, the influence of prosperity and ideology.     

ADMINISTRATIVE PROFESSIONALS AND THE DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS: THE CASE OF CITIZEN SERVICE CENTRES

This article examines how administrative professionals affect the diffusion of one‐stop shops in the form of integrated citizen service centres (CSC) in a Danish local government setting. CSCs are an example of a new organizational form: functionally integrated small units (FISUs). The diffusion of the CSCs among municipalities is used to analyse how administrative professionals act as drivers in the process of organizational level innovation. Furthermore, it is examined how institutional, political and economic characteristics of municipalities influence the likelihood of adoption. The findings highlight that a high concentration of administrative professionals indeed make the adoption of CSCs more likely. Additionally, the findings confirm three commonly stated hypotheses from the diffusion of innovations literature, namely that need based demands, wealth and the regional supply of CSC increase the likelihood of its adoption.     

Campaigning on behalf of the party? Party constraints on candidate campaign personalisation

This article analyses what makes political candidates run a party‐focused or personalised election campaign. Prior work shows that candidates face incentives from voters and the media to personalise their campaign rhetoric and promises at the expense of party policy. This has raised concerns about the capacity of parties to govern effectively and voters’ ability to hold individual politicians accountable. This article builds on the literature on party organisation and considers the possible constraints candidates face from their party in personalising their election campaigns. Specifically, it is argued that party control over the candidate nomination process and campaign financing constrains most political candidates in following electoral incentives for campaign personalisation. Using candidate survey data from the 2009 EP election campaign in 27 countries, the article shows how candidates from parties in which party officials exerted greater control over the nomination process and campaign finances were less likely to engage in personalised campaigning at the expense of the party programme. The findings imply that most parties, as central gatekeepers and resource suppliers, hold important control mechanisms for countering the electoral pressure for personalisation and advance our understanding of the incentives and constraints candidates face when communicating with voters. The article discusses how recent democratic reforms, paradoxically, might induce candidate personalisation with potential negative democratic consequences.