The Changing Role of Central Banks and the Role of Competition in Financial Regulation during (and in the Aftermath of) the Financial Crisis

Rescue cases involving guarantees (contrasted with restructuring cases) during the recent Financial Crisis, have illustrated the prominent position that the goal of promoting financial stability has assumed over that of the prevention or limitation of possible distortions of competition which may arise when granting State aid. The importance attached to maintaining and promoting financial stability—as well as the need to facilitate rescue and restructuring measures aimed at preventing systemically relevant financial institutions from failure, demonstrate how far authorities are willing to overlook certain competition policies. However, increased government and central bank intervention also simultaneously trigger the usual concerns—which include moral hazard and the danger of serving as long‐term substitutes for market discipline. How far central banks and governments should intervene and how far distortions of competition should be permitted ultimately depends on how systemically relevant a financial institution is.     

Patterns of risky sexual behaviors among emerging adults in intimate sexual relationships in two tertiary institutions in southwestern Nigeria

This study explored patterns of risky sexual practices and perceived vulnerability to sexually transmitted infections among 450 sexually active emerging adults (18–25 years) through a self-administered questionnaire and 43 interviews. Findings showed that 97.4% of men and 98.1% of women were in intimate sexual relationships, among which 74% of men and 46.5% of women had unprotected vaginal intercourse and anal sex (α = 1.74 for men and 1.09 for women) within the past month. Consequences of unprotected sexual practices notwithstanding, engagement in risky sexual practices prevail. Redesigning of current behavioral modification approaches targeted toward promoting healthy sexual practices in young adulthood is required.     

The Role of the IASB and Auditing Standards in the Aftermath of the 2008/20091 Financial Crisis

The primary argument of this article is, namely, that the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is in need of an enforcement mechanism. In drawing attention to this argument, the article not only proposes considerations which are to be taken into account if such a mechanism is to be implemented, but also considers areas in which the regulation of accounting standards, and auditing standards in particular, have contributed to the recent global financial crisis. The impact of such standards on pro‐cyclicality, the level of success achieved by the IASB and other international standard setters, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, relates to how effectively the accounting and audit standard setting is implemented. As well as identifying the importance of convergence in contributing towards high quality audits and the consistent application of auditing and accounting standards, this article also acknowledges the difficulties and challenges encountered in attempting to achieve a convergent framework. Furthermore, through a discussion of recommendations aimed at consolidating transparency and accounting, as proposed by the G20, ways in which accounting standards, and, consequently, the IASB, could contribute further to the improvement of transparency and accountability of the framework for fair value measurements and evaluation, are considered. The absence of enforcement mechanisms, the fact that enforcement actions are carried out at national level in various EU Member States, present sources of obstacles to attempts to realise the proposals put forward by the G20. This article not only attempts to address such factors, but also to suggest ways in which the IASB, to an extent, could realise its goals. Through a consideration of two enforcement regimes in Europe, namely Germany and the UK, two related standards which govern enforcement in Europe, principles on which harmonisation of the institutional oversight systems in Europe may be achieved , and the vital contribution made by the Committee of European Securities Regulators and the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group, this article will consider how enforcement could be implemented by the IASB at a European level.     

Weep for the One Who Descends? African Democracies,Politics of Stomach Infrastructure,and Homology of Corruption

This article discusses contemporary African democratic practices vis-à-vis politics of stomach infrastructure that debilitates sustainable infrastructural development in the region. In this article, clarifications are articulated within four interlinked phenomena: the enthusiasm for democracy, its collapse, and the resurgence of hybrid-democratic order that metamorphosed into politics of stomach infrastructure that facilitates corruption in African postcolonial state. It unravels the existing democratic prototype against ideal democratic order. The article considered the prevailing democratic inclination moseyed through citizens and political elite’s armistice that presage democratic peril. The article argued that unscrupulous political collaboration and democratic debauchery that exist between the political elites and the electorates craft an opportunity for institutionalized corruption in the region. Finally, the article found homogenous paradigms of corruption in the selected African states, including South Africa, Tanzania, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Nigeria.