The effect of 1,2-indanedione,a latent fingerprint reagent on subsequent DNA profiling

The compound 1,2-indanedione was recently introduced in our laboratory as an operational reagent for developing latent fingerprints on porous surfaces. As part of the reagent implementation, a study was carried out in order to determine whether either of the two operational 1,2-indanediones formulations interferes with further DNA profiling. Both formulations are based on HFE7100 solvent. One is acidic and the other neutral. In a controlled experiment, known donors attached stamps to envelopes by licking them. The stamped envelopes were initially treated with either one indanedione formulation or the other, and DNA was then extracted for STR typing. No differences were observed between the STR profiles obtained from treated and untreated stamps and envelopes, indicating that 1,2-indanedione does not adversely affect the extraction and subsequent amplification of the STRs examined. However, preliminary results indicate that potential DNA analysis depends on the time interval between the indanedione treatment and DNA extraction as no DNA can be recovered six days following treatment. For this reason, it is strongly recommended to extract DNA from treated items of evidence as soon as possible after indanedione treatment.     

Threat mail and forensic science: DNA profiling from items of evidence after treatment with DFO

Two cases of threatening letters with their accompanying envelopes were received to the Division of Forensic Identification unit of the Israel Police. The envelopes, including the stamps, and the letters were initially examined for latent fingerprints by the DFO reagent, known to cause degradation of DNA. Although no latent fingerprints could be visualized on any of the items, the biology laboratory using organic DNA extraction, was successful in defining genetic profiles from all the items employing six STR loci, even after treatment with DFO. In a controlled experiment, a known donor attached a stamp, by licking, to an envelope. This item was treated with DFO and then profiled using STR loci. The results showed that previous DFO treatment on the control stamp before DNA analysis had no negative effects on obtaining the DNA profile of the known donor using STR loci.     

The evolution of the European Union’s failed approach to Afghanistan

ABSTRACT

This article provides a genealogical account of European actorness in Afghanistan. It argues that European agreement towards facilitating modernisation and development in Afghanistan was initiated with aid and trade, evolving into humanitarianism in the 1990s, and reconstruction and democratisation in the 2000s. The European Union has had a positive impact on Afghanistan, focusing on humanitarianism, but its multilateral and programme level approach to reconstruction and democratisation has failed to meet the EU’s stated objectives. By promoting the flawed “Bonn Model”, the EU is proportionally culpable for failed international attempts to reconstruct Afghanistan; even though the United States has been the primary international actor. Drawing a series of broader lessons, such as tensions between Atlantic solidarity and European integration, and the limitations of the European crisis management, the article demonstrates how European policy has been shaped by crises inside Afghanistan and the larger geopolitical crises these have generated. These have contemporary importance as history suggests that as the US withdraws its commitment to Afghanistan, the EU will have a very significant role in attempting to fill a humanitarian vacuum.     

Securitising proliferation, failing security governance: the European Union’s role in India and Pakistan’s nuclear rivalry

In 2003, the European Union declared the threat of weapons of mass destruction ‘potentially the greatest threat to our security’ and increasingly called for the issue of nuclear proliferation to be managed within its preferred multilateral security governance frameworks. In spite of this, and the increased securitisation of proliferation, the EU has fundamentally continued its historical record of failing to engage with India and Pakistan’s nuclear rivalry, and has not been able to move significantly beyond a relationship with South Asia based on trade and aid. This is deeply problematic given the regional instability posed by the Indo-Pakistani enduring rivalry, and the fact that Pakistan is not only an unstable nuclear weapons state, but has been known to harbour international terrorists and nuclear proliferators. Given these conditions, as the EU acknowledges, the stakes of failing to engage could not be higher. A deeper analysis of EU engagement, however, demonstrates that EU security governance is limited, ineffectual, inconsistent and largely perceived as neo-colonial in what is the world’s most likely nuclear flashpoint. If the EU is to be considered a global actor in security governance, a key objective of the Treaty of Lisbon, then this needs to be redressed.