Three cheers for liberal modesty

ABSTRACT

Many liberals have been immodest in postulating that their own progressive, secular liberalism is the only one that can be justified in public reason. In Liberalism’s Religion, I articulate a more modest theory of liberalism and religion. While I personally endorse progressive secular liberalism, I argue that it is only one of the reasonable conceptions of liberal justice. This liberal modesty has profound, hitherto unnoticed implications for (i) the role of religious arguments in the public sphere, (ii) the legitimacy of religious establishment, and (iii) the justifiability of religious exemptions. In this article, I defend these three claims by providing replies to my critics.     

Justice,Fairness, and World Ownership

It is a central tenet of most contemporarytheories of justice that the badly-off have aright to some of the resources of the well-off.In this paper, I take as my starting point twoprinciples of justice, to wit, the principle ofsufficiency, whereby individuals have a rightto the material resources they need in order tolead a decent life, and the principle ofautonomy, whereby once everybody has such alife, individuals should be allowed to pursuetheir conception of the good, and to enjoy thefruits of their labour in pursuit of suchconception. I also endorse the value offairness, whereby the right person orinstitution makes the decision as to whether tobring about justice.I show that justice and fairness can besatisfied only if we all enjoy a combination ofprivate and collective rights over the world.In making that case, I shall argue that the setof ownership rights I advocate differs fromreadily available conceptions of restrictedprivate ownership in two important respects.First, it is such that in some circumstances,two individuals or more can have control rightsover the same property at the same time, not,as is standardly the case in legal systems, bycontracting with one another (through gifts andjoint purchase), but simply on grounds ofjustice. Second, it allows that, if necessary,property-owners be expropriated from theirproperty without compensation.     

Hard responses to corruption: Penal standards and the repression of corruption in Britain, France and Portugal

Despite its difficulties and inconsistencies in framing those practices andconducts recently unveiled by the press and judicial investigations whichhave caused considerable public discontent, the penal definition ofcorruption still highlights an interesting conceptual diversity across spaceand time that should not be overlooked. Most official discussions about andreferences to corruption and its volume are still framed within these hardparameters. It is, therefore, important to look at the intricacies ofcorruption as a crime in order to understand the virtues and failures ofnational repressive efforts. While crime statistics are of limited use for itsmeasurement, they can nevertheless help to interpret the way corruptionhas been treated through repressive instruments cross-nationally over aperiod of time.The aim of this paper is to assess the dynamics of the various processes ofsetting and revising penal standards to the conduct of office holders and theresults observable from the application of corruption and related offencesacross countries with different legal traditions.