Whether one votes and how one votes

The aim of this paper is to determine if whether one votes effects the vote that is cast. Using an economic model of voting and observed voting results on nuclear power referenda, the answer is a resounding yes. Overcoming registration, turnout, and “roll off” hurdles dramatically increases the odds of voting against nuclear power. Indeed, participation swamps both economic and preference variables in the explanation of nuclear power voting outcomes. The lesson is that there is a structure to participation at the polls that should not be ignored by those interested in analyzing voting outcomes.     

A recursive treatment of the hurdles to voting

In order to vote on a particular issue, voters first must leap the hurdles of registration, turnout, and roll-off. One way to think of these hurdles is along the lines of rational absention; at the time when a voter decides to register, they solve the forward looking problem of whether or not they expect to vote at all. In a sense, before they jump even one hurdle they will have decided that they will jump them all. But this formulation misses the complexity of the act itself. Voters do not even always know what issues will be on the ballot, how they will feel, and which of the ballot issues they may vote on at a later date. From this perspective, individuals start the “voting race” and drop out as dictated by their calculus en route to the final hurdle; registration, turnout, and roll-off are fraught with successive impediments consistent with a recursive empirical treatment of voting. The design and implementation of such a recursive treatment is the goal of this paper.     

The ideological component of Senate voting: Different principles or different principals?

Evidence exists on both sides of the question of whether or not legislator-specific, ideologically-driven shirking of constituent interest occurs. In this paper, we use a well-known model of such shirking by senators as our point of departure and add measures of inter-state constituent interests, the role of campaign contributions and, hence, the importance of whether or not senators are up for reelection. We find some evidence that the model provides a stronger explanation for senators up for reelection than for those who are not and that campaign contributions help determine voting decisions by these legislators. Finally, accounting for inter-state constituent interests, shirking is not a significant variable in the voting decisions of senators facing reelection. Thus, it appears that the reelection interests of some senators have been mistaken for ideologically-driven shirking.     

Measuring the impact of fair trade on development

This study of the impact of fair trade relies on new field data from coffee and banana co-operatives in Peru and Costa Rica, including a detailed assessment of its welfare effects by comparing FT farmers with non-FT farmers as a benchmark. Attention is focused on three major effects: (a) direct tangible impact of FT arrangements on the income, welfare, and livelihoods of rural households; (b) indirect effects of fair trade for improving credit access, capital stocks, investments, and attitudes to risk; and (c) institutional implications of fair trade for farmers' organisations and externalities for local and regional employment, bargaining, and trading conditions. Although direct effects in terms of net income remain fairly modest, important benefits are found to include capitalising farmers and strengthening their organisations.