Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median,Ministerial Autonomy,and the Coalition Compromise

In parliamentary democracies, governments are typically composed of multiple political parties working together in a coalition. Such governments must confront a fundamental challenge in policymaking—the preferences of coalition parties often diverge significantly, but the government can adopt only one common policy on any specific issue. This fact raises a critical question that has far‐reaching implications for the quality of democratic representation: Whose preferences are ultimately reflected in coalition policy choices? In this study, we explore three competing answers to this question derived from the theoretical literature on multiparty governance and parliamentary institutions. Our findings, based on an analysis of the legislative history of more than 1,000 government bills from three parliamentary democracies, strongly suggest that coalition policies reflect a compromise between government parties rather than the preferences of the ministers proposing them or the preferences of the median party in the legislature.     

The Abuse Disability Questionnaire: Internal Consistency and Validity Considerations in Two Samples

Comparative psychometric information on the Abuse Disability Questionnaire (ADQ), given to women who were receiving services from domestic violence shelters, was presented. The total score of the ADQ and its subscale scores for Relationship Disability, Life Restriction, Psychological Dysfunction, and Health Status Issues demonstrated adequate internal consistency across two shelter samples. Further construct validation was evidenced by the relationship found between self-esteem and impairment, and also between prior abuse and impairment. Additional research to establish the utility of the Abuse Disability Questionnaire as a research and/or clinical instrument was proposed.     

A market based evaluation of the election versus appointment of regulatory commissioners

This paper examines the elected versus appointed commissioner dichotomy from a market value perspective. Previous empirical analysis tends to concentrate on rates rather than examining the impact on shareholders' wealth. We examine life insurance industry data during the period surrounding the passage of California's Proposition 103. The primary impact of the referendum on life insurers is to change the method of commissioner selection from appointment to popular vote. We find that this change significantly reduced the value of life insurers doing business in California. This result is consistent with the recent findings of Boyes and McDowell (1989) and Smartt (1994) using alternative evaluation procedures for firms in other regulated industries. This implies that the change to a popular election of commissioners either increases the level of risk and/or decreases the expected cash flows of regulated firms.     

Coalition Government,Legislative Institutions,and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies

Most democracies are governed by coalitions, comprising multiple political parties with conflicting policy positions. The prevalence of these governments poses a significant question: Which parties' electoral commitments are ultimately reflected in government policy? Recent theories have challenged our understanding of multiparty government, arguing that the relative influence of coalition parties depends crucially on institutional context. Specifically, where institutions allow credible enforcement of bargains, policy should reflect a compromise among all governing parties; where such institutions are absent, the preferences of parties controlling the relevant ministries should prevail. Critically, empirical work has thus far failed to provide direct evidence for this conditional relationship. Analyzing changes in social protection policies in 15 parliamentary democracies, we provide the first systematic evidence that the strength of legislative institutions significantly shapes the relative policy influence of coalition parties. Our findings have implications for our understanding of coalition government, policymaking, and electoral responsiveness.