The Impact of Converting Categorical into Block Grants: The Lessons from the 314(d) Block Grant in the Partnership for Health Act

Section 314(d) of P. L. 89–749, (1966), the Partnershipfor Health Act, combined nine categorical health grants intoone block grant for health. The impact of section 314(d), according to data gathered forthis study, can be summarized as follows: the block grant increasedthe administrative flexibility of state health officials; statehealth planning agencies generally did not have a major influenceon the block grant; state health planning agencies located ingovernors' offices had less influence over the block grant thanthose located in state health departments; Congress did notsignificantly increase expenditures for the block grant; nationalinfluence was increased by creating health programs that couldpotentially have been made part of the block grant; and theblock grant did not generally result in a reordering of spendingpriorities. The best explanation for the unspectacular effect of combiningseveral categorical grants into one block grant was that, withoutnew resources, the substantial (and welcome) new administrativeflexibility given state officials was insufficient to producean important substantive reordering of program priorities.     

Was Idi Amin's Government a Terrorist Regime?

What does state terrorism look like? How do we distinguish it from other forms of mass state violence, such as repression or genocide? Based on the developing literature on state terrorism, this study presents three expectations that violence perpetrated by the state should meet if it is to be classified as state terrorism: these are (a) that the violence is perpetrated by agents of the state, (b) that the violence is visible, and (c) that state terrorism focused against a state's own citizens will be carried out by an autocratic, personalistic regime. Drawing substantially on a series of primary sources, this study demonstrates that Idi Amin's regime in Uganda from 1971 to 1979 did engage in state terrorism against its own citizens.     

Finance capital and peasants in Colonial West Africa: A comment on Cowen and Shenton

The presence of finance capital in colonial West Africa was predicated on the presence of imperial administration and merchant capital. From these it derived its profits. Cowen and Shenton suggested finance capital was seeking to diversify its sources of profit by engaging cocoa farmers in credit. While this may have been true for the period of cocoa boom before the First World War, it is argued in this piece that in 1938‐more than 20 years later ‐ the banks’ motivation was entirely defensive. No diversification was intended, and the action was directed at salvaging current business. This comment does not question Cowen and Shenton's ‘Fabianism’ thesis but substitutes merchant for finance capital as being in conflict with Colonial Office attitudes.