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Propensity to offend is an important and stable predictor of offending. A person’s propensity is often thought of as a multidimensional
trait consisting of morality and low self-control. The aim of this paper is to explain individual differences in propensity
to offend as one single construct and two of its dimensions, namely morality and low self-control. It is well established
that low levels of morality and low self-control increase the risk of offending. However, there is less empirical research
that focuses on the main predictors of morality and self-control. Therefore the main research question for this study is to
explain to what extent parental attachment, parental control and the school social bond have a direct effect on one’s propensity
to offend (low morality or delinquency tolerance and low self-control). The data are drawn from two different samples of young
adolescents in Antwerp, Belgium (N = 2,486), and Halmstad, Sweden (N = 1,003). The results show that parental control, parental
attachment and the school social bond have direct effects on individual differences in propensity to offend, regardless of
individual background variables. The results are highly equivalent in both samples. The similarity of the results across two
independent samples suggests that the findings are stable. Implications for further studies are discussed. 相似文献
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The Belgian party-archy violates the ideal-type chain of parliamentary delegation in many ways, insofar as political parties play a predominant role at each stage. They channel the delegation of power from voters to MPs, from Parliament to the cabinet, from the collective cabinet to individual ministers, and from ministers to their civil servants. Hence, they can be considered the effective principals in the polity, and many actors of the parliamentary chain of delegation, such as MPs, ministers, and civil servants have been reduced to mere party agents. The extreme fragmentation of the Belgian party system in combination with its increasing need for multilevel coordination have further enhanced the position of political parties in the Belgian polity. Yet, at the same time (since the early 1990s), Belgium has also witnessed a gradual decline in the informal system of partitocratic delegation and clientelistic excesses, thereby giving back part of their autonomy to some formal agents, such as the cabinet, top civil servants and some MPs. Still, one can wonder whether these corrections are sufficient to counter the strong outburst of public dissatisfaction with the way parties have run the country in past decades. 相似文献
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Eveline De Wree Lieven Pauwels Charlotte Colman Brice De Ruyver 《Crime, Law and Social Change》2009,52(5):513-525
In most Western European countries, including Belgium, judicial alternative sanctions are increasingly being used for drug users. Because no study into the effectiveness of Belgian judicial alternatives for drug users has yet been carried out, this became the objective of the current research. The design of this study comprises a pre and post measurement of the criminal activity, drug use and situation in different spheres of life of 565 drug-dependent offenders. Two conclusions can be drawn. First, after an alternative sanction or measure is imposed, there is a reduction in the criminal activity of the offender. Second, this crime reduction goes hand in hand with a progress in several relevant life spheres. 相似文献
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Anatol Lieven 《亚洲事务》2013,44(1):57-68
This is an updated version of the lecture which he gave to the society on 30 October 2007. 相似文献
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The issue of instability in a simple policy game between the central bank and a representative union
In the recent economic literature the independence of the central bank is often considered to be one of the most effective guarantees to achieve price stability. A strong theoretical basis for this proposition is that the monetary policy delegation given to an independent central bank is an optimal instrument to avoid the time inconsistency problem of monetary policy. This paper investigates the stability properties of this solution in a simple game in which the private sector (i.e. the trade unions) and the public sector (i.e. the central bank) simultaneously interact. A representative monopoly union is considered, and – in line with the recent economic debate – two types of unions are investigated: (i) the standard micro-founded trade union; (ii) the inflation-averse trade union. In both cases, we find that the requirement for the Nash equilibrium to be stable imposes a limit to the conservativeness of the central bank. Instability of the Nash equilibrium reveals a strategic co-ordination failure between the public and the private sector. 相似文献
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