What We Have Learned About Teaching Multiparty Negotiation

This article grows out of our experience teaching an advanced course on multiparty negotiation. The main question underlying the course is: “How can experts in two‐party negotiations make themselves effective multiparty negotiators?” In this article, we describe what and how we taught, what we think worked, and what we decided to change after the first year of teaching.     

Alternatives to abstinence: the practice of (un)safe sex in prison

Correctional rules and regulations requiring sexual abstinence for prison inmates, coupled with unsupported beliefs about the risks of condom provision, keep most inmates in a dangerous muddle of criminalized sexual expression, covert efforts at erroneous myth-based safe sex practices, and high risk of sexual disease contraction and transmission. With the vast majority of inmates eventually released to re-enter communities across the US, these health concerns are not quarantined to the correctional environment, but rather contribute to what has been described as the hidden epidemic in public health . Using inmate voice from a large-scale national examination of inmate sexual behavior, the current study explores inmates’ attempts at ‘safe sex’ in an environment where sexual behavior, though prohibited, frequently occurs, and where no sex is the only accepted form of ‘safe’ sex. Inmates identify many approaches to safe sexual practice including barrier protection, partner selection, and risk reduction strategies. Unfortunately, many improvised, though innovative, inmate protection strategies reflect a very rudimentary understanding of safe sex for the purpose of reducing disease transmission and contraction, frequently exacerbating these risks. Policy implications include widespread condom provision and expanded inmate education and programming around sexual health and disease prevention.     

Seeking Sustainable Solutions: Using an Attractor Simulation Platform for Teaching Multistakeholder Negotiation in Complex Cases

We live and work in an increasingly complex and dynamic world. The demands of working in such environments require that negotiators understand situations of conflict and work with these situations in correspondingly complex and dynamic ways. Dynamical systems theory offers important insights and tools to enhance the understanding of difficult social conflicts, including the conceptualization of ongoing destructive conflicts as strong attractors: a particular form of self-organization of multiple elements comprising the mental and social systems associated with conflict. This article describes the pedagogical use of a computer simulation of conflict attractors (the attractor software) that allows participants to visualize and work interactively with the dynamics of conflict as they unfold over time. It further describes a negotiation workshop that employs the simulation to enhance participants' understanding of complex long-term dynamics in conflict and presents the findings of two outcome studiescomparing the effectiveness of a workshop that employed the simulation with one that employed a traditional integrative problem-solving method. While not definitive, these studies suggest that an understanding of the dynamical approach to conflict, supported by use of the attractor software, can promote the generation of more sustainable solutions for long-term conflicts.     

Can a deportation policy backfire?

Drawing on a model in which utility is derived from consumption and effort (labor supply), we ask how the deportation of a number of undocumented migrants influences the decisions regarding labor supply, consumption, and savings of the remaining undocumented migrants. We assume that the intensity of deportation serves as an indicator to the remaining undocumented migrants when they assess the probability of being deported. We find that a higher rate of deportation induces undocumented migrants to work harder, consume less and, as a result of those responses, to save more. Assuming that the purpose of deportation policy is to reduce the aggregate labor supply of undocumented migrants in order to raise the wages of low-skilled native workers, we conclude that the policy can backfire: an increase in the labor supply of the remaining undocumented migrants can more than offset the reduction in the labor supply arising from the deportation of some undocumented migrants. Simulation shows that if the number of deportations in relation to the size of the undocumented migrant workforce is small, then the combined effect of the reduction in the labor supply of the deportees and the increase in the labor supply of the remaining undocumented migrants can be that the aggregate labor supply of undocumented migrants will increase. It follows that an effective deportation policy has to involve the expulsion of a substantial proportion of the total number of undocumented migrants in the workforce.