Cross-national integration in Northeast Asia: Geopolitical and economic goals in conflict

To shed light on conflicting views of the regional readjustment under way, this article views Northeast Asia from various geographical angles. It compares local strategies for regionalism, identifying the perspectives of six border cities, two each in China, Japan, and Russia. Problems of regionalism are treated in light of the poor fit among local strategies. The past five years have produced more conflict than cooperation, which can also be explained by differing national strategies. The article examines linkages among the region’s powers, suggesting how they affect regionalism, and concludes with an analysis of divergence in national strategies.     

A chance for a breakthrough in Russo-Japanese relations: will the logic of great power relations prevail?

Under Mori Yoshiro the Japanese government energetically pursued Russia's new leader, Vladimir Putin. Progress was achieved, as Putin recognized the 1956 treaty in which Moscow pledged to return two islands. From the summer of 2000, however, a backlash could be detected. The architects of the initiative not only failed to make their case to Japanese politicians, but also became the object of two years of attacks, leading to Suzuki Muneo's ouster from the LDP and arrest and to Togo Kazuhiko being fired as ambasador to The Netherlands. Under Koizumi Junichiro Japan lost interest, while the media feasted on the image of foreign policy being hijacked. Lost in the media frenzy and setback to relations was the case for why Tokyo and Moscow need each other as great power partners in the face of rising Chinese power and overwhelming US power. Since both parties sided with the US war against terror, the logic of cooperation has become clearer. A general outline for an interim agreement is well understood on both sides, but a breakthrough is unlikely soon.     

Chinese National Identity and Its Implications for International Relations in East Asia

This article traces the evolution of heightened Chinese expectations and the resultant spike in national identity in 2010, using a six-dimensional framework: 1) ideological, 2) temporal, 3) sectoral, 4) vertical, 5) horizontal, and 6) intensity. A hybrid ideology rose to the forefront. Forceful historical arguments covered three distinct periods. The triad of economic, cultural, and political identity raised sectoral identity to an unprecedented level. The leadership kept pressing the case for vertical identity in contrast to the West. Above all, it put the spotlight on horizontal identity to draw a sharper contrast with the United States and neighboring states as well. If at the time of the Hu-Obama summit the tone softened somewhat, China continued its risky wager on widening the identity gap. Regardless of whether China's foreign policy is currently assertive, its national identity narrative remains a driving force for divisiveness in the regional and international order.     

Chinese Strategic Thinking on Multilateral Regional Security in Northeast Asia

This article argues that multilateral mechanisms for addressing security issues in East Asia are weak and that a key reason is the hollowness of China's ostensible and much-touted commitment to multilateralism. This is especially troubling when the region faces major security challenges and regional relations (and China's approach to them) appear to be moving from “economics in command” to “security in command.” The article concludes with a prediction that “A coordinated approach to combining alliances and quasi-alliances exclusive of China with multilateralism inclusive of it will best test China's intentions during this decade.”     

South Korea and Sino-Japanese rivalry: a middle power's options within the East Asian core triangle

Abstract

South Korea is a middle power in a region where its scope of action can rise and fall quickly and diplomatic flexibility is needed. Neither realist responses to threats nor idealist trust in integration meet its needs for adjusting triangular ties with China and Japan, as their relations become the principal great power divide in Northeast Asia. Its optimal choice is as a facilitator biding its time when tensions over both security and national identity clashes are intense, while preparing for opportunities. Four conditions would give it a favorable environment: forward-looking foreign leadership; security challenges brought under some control; subsiding preoccupation with national identities; and its own strategic planning with care not to overreach. Multiple possibilities emerge if it can rebuild ties with Japan as part of a triangle with China as well as one with the United States and also synchronize ties with China to other ties. Even amidst recurrent tensions, the core East Asian triangle offers Seoul a chance to take advantage of changing dynamics in the world's most ascendant region.     

Northeast Asia: Regionalism,a clash of civilizations,or a strategic quadrangle?

“Regionalism” has been a popular concept in Northeast Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, but there is little agreement about what the concept means or how to realize it in practical terms. Detailed examination of what has been happening in relations between the major powers in the region leads Gilbert Rozman of Princeton University to discern three different approaches to regionalism: economic regionalism, great power conflict, and civilizational clashes, each associated to some degree with the reasoning of one of the three major regional powers, Japan, China, and Russia. Economic regionalism is likely to provide most gains for all nations in Northeast Asia in the long term, but in the medium term, more great power and civilizational conflict can be expected.     

Unanswered Questions about Japan-Russia Relations in 2017

Divergent views of Japan-Russia relations in 2017 result from leaving questions unanswered. This article seeks to answer the following queries. What is the sales pitch in Japan for Abe's wooing of Putin? Why is this rationale misleading? Why is Abe keen on pursuing Putin? What motivates Putin to encourage Abe yet hold back? When did talks hit a snag? Why was 2016 different from 2001? Is the US to blame for no breakthrough? What are the cause and effect of scapegoating for no summit success? Which Japanese criticisms—by the left or the right—of the summit make a better case? Do Abe and Putin have much freedom to maneuver? Where are Japan-Russia relations now headed? Through responses to these questions, we gain an understanding of the misleading coverage of the December 15–16 Putin visit to Japan and the difficulties ahead for Abe to achieve a breakthrough in Japan-Russia relations.     

Post Cold War Evolution of Chinese Thinking on Regional Institutions in Northeast Asia

A review of four periods and a comparison of three regional institutions provide evidence for how serious China has become about multilateralism with its neighbors in Asia. Approval for multilateralism does not mean that China is ready to endorse strong regional organizations that bind their members, especially when it has reservations both about institutions that could undermine its narrow notion of sovereignty and norms that could support US or even Japanese efforts to impose long-feared universal values. If China calculates that limited multilateralism now provides a variety of benefits, to date its support reflects specific circumstances, not general trust in this format. Focusing on the Six-Party Talks as the presumed foundation for regionalism in Northeast Asia offers a concentrated view of strategic thinking toward the area most vital to China's security. In the standoff between North Korea and the United States we are able to assess the degree to which China accepts working with four or five states and the prospects for its active support, if circumstances permit, for the establishment of a peace and security mechanism through the fifth working group that originated in the Joint Agreement of February 2007.