The Special Case Thesis and the Dual Nature of Law

In this article, I take up two arguments in favor of the discursive model of legal argumentation: the claim to correctness argument and the dual nature thesis. The argument of correctness implies the dual nature thesis, and the dual nature thesis implies a nonpositivistic concept of law. The nonpositivistic concept of law comprises five ideas. One of them is the special case thesis. The special case thesis says that positivistic elements, that is, statutes, precedents, and prevailing doctrines, are necessary for law in order to achieve legal certainty. Without this, law would not be as perfect as it could possibly be. But it says, at the same time, that this alone would not be enough to fulfill the claim to correctness. The claim to correctness refers not only to the real dimension of law, defined by statutes, precedents, and prevailing doctrines, but also to its ideal dimension, defined, first and foremost, by justice. The special case thesis is my oldest thesis. It has remained an essential element of my system over the years. Its connection with four other theses—the Radbruch formula, the human rights thesis, the idea of deliberative democracy, and principles theory—does not change this at all. On the contrary, this connection has lent greater strength to the special case thesis.     

The Nature of Legal Philosophy

Abstract. Philosophy is general and systematic reflection about what there is, what ought to be done or is good, and how knowledge about both is possible. Legal philosophy raises these questions with respect to the law. In so doing, legal philosophy is engaged in reasoning about the nature of law. The arguments addressed to the question of the nature of law revolve around three problems. The first problem addresses the question: In what kinds of entities does the law consist, and how are these entities connected such that they form the overarching entity we call “law”? The answer is that law consists of norms as meaning contents which form a normative system. The second problem addresses the question of how norms as meaning contents are connected with the real world. This connection can be grasped by means of the concepts of authoritative issuance and social efficacy. The latter includes the concept of coercion or force. The third problem addresses the correctness or legitimacy of law, and, by this, the relationship between law and morality. To ask about the nature of law is to ask about necessary relations between the concepts of normative meaning, authoritative issuance as well as social efficacy, and correctness of content.     

德语世界的法哲学——《德语法学思想译丛》总序

德语世界的法哲学可以追溯到非常久远的年代,然而,其中最具决定性影响的时期是德国的"黄金时代",也就是从七年战争(1756-1763)的末期到1870年普法战争之间的百余年时光.这个时期,一如莫扎特、贝多芬之于音乐,歌德、席勒之于文学,辛克尔、卡斯帕之于艺术,高斯之于数学以及亚历山大·洪堡之于自然科学,康德与黑格尔也先后在哲学上开启了不朽的历史.     

Causes of Action: First Findings of the LSRC Periodic Survey

In this paper we report some of the first findings of the LSRC periodic survey of justiciable problems. We confirm the prevalence of justiciable problems amongst the general population. We identify important differences in the experiences of discrete socio–demographic populations, not only in terms of the number of problems faced, but also in terms of the perception of problems and reactions to them. We show that cost is not the principal barrier to taking action or obtaining advice across most problem categories. Other concerns, such as fear or uncertainty as to what can be done are generally more prevalent. We illustrate the range of strategies employed by those who take action, and confirm the rarity of court action. Finally we show that the basic form of Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat's aetiology of lawsuits is recognizable within our findings, although we explain that the manner and form of progression through the various stages is complex and irregular.     

Constitutional Rights, Balancing, and Rationality

Abstract.   The article begins with an outline of the balancing construction as developed by the German Federal Constitutional court since the Lüth decision in 1958. It then takes up two objections to this approach raised by Jürgen Habermas. The first maintains that balancing is both irrational and a danger for rights, depriving them of their normative power. The second is that balancing takes one out of the realm of right and wrong, correctness and incorrectness, and justification, and, thus, out of the realm of the law. The article attempts to counter these objections by showing that there exists a rational structure of balancing that can be made explicit by a "Law of Balancing" and a "Disproportionality Rule." These rules show, first, that balancing is not a danger for rights but, on the contrary, a necessary means of lending them protection, and second, that balancing is not an alternative to argumentation but an indispensable form of rational practical discourse.     

Legal Certainty and Correctness

What is the relation between legal certainty and correctness? This question poses one of the perpetual problems of the theory and practice of law—and for this reason: The answer turns on the main question in legal philosophy, the question of the concept and the nature of law. Thus, in an initial step, I will briefly look at the concept and the nature of law. In a second step, I will attempt to explain what the concept and the nature of law, thus understood, imply for the relation between legal certainty and correctness. Here three issues will be considered: first, the Radbruch formula as an answer to the problem of extreme injustice; second, the special case thesis, which claims that legal argumentation is a special case of general practical argumentation; and, third, the problem of the judicial development of the law.     

Back for the future: a client centred analysis of social welfare and family law provision

The landscape of legal advice provision is entering a period of significant change in England and Wales. Whilst there is a great deal of uncertainty about how the future landscape of advice service provision will evolve, there are lessons to be drawn from past delivery models.

This article first looks back at the period following the Access to Justice Act 1999, setting out a range of delivery models initiated following the Act, as well as research and evaluation conducted in the millennium decade. Findings are then presented from a comprehensive qualitative study on how people experience and deal with social welfare and family problems, and on facilitators and barriers to integrated advice provision, including inter-organisational working. This is explored through the lens of a delivery model which emphasised partnership and the pooling of resources and specialisms to meet client needs: the Community Legal Advice Centre model.     

On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison

The formal structure of subsumption may be represented in a deductive scheme, which one might call the "Subsumption Formula." The author argues that there is an analogous scheme for the formal structure of balancing or weighing, which he terms the "Weight Formula." In short, subsumption and balancing have comparable schemata, through which the formal structure of a set of premisses, which warrant the inference to a legal result, can be identified. The relation in the two cases between these premisses and the ensuing legal result is, however, different. The Subsumption Formula is represented by a scheme that works according to the rules of logic, the Weight Formula, by a scheme that works according to the rules of arithmetic. In spite of this difference, the two formulae are alike in that judgments, in both cases, remain the basis of the argument.