Supply or Demand? Migration and Political Manipulation in Mexico

Collective remittances are the money flows sent by hometown associations (HTAs) of migrants from the USA to their communities of origin. In Mexico, the 3?×?1 Program for Migrants matches by three the amounts that HTAs send back to their localities to invest in public projects. In previous research, we found that municipalities ruled by the party of the federal government were more likely to participate in the Program. The political bias in participation and fund allocation may stem from two possible mechanisms: HTAs?? decisions to invest in some municipalities but not in others may reflect migrants?? political preferences (a demand-driven bias). Alternatively, government officials may use the Program to finance their own political objectives (a supply-driven bias). To determine which of these two mechanisms is at work, we studied a 2?×?2 matrix of statistically selected cases of high-migration municipalities in the Mexican state of Guanajuato. We carried out over 60 semistructured interviews with state and municipal Program administrators, local politicians, and migrant leaders from these municipalities. Our qualitative study indicates that migrant leaders are clearly pragmatic and that the political bias found is driven by elected officials strategically using the Program. The bias in favor of political strongholds is reinforced by the Program??s requirements for cooperation among different levels of government. This study casts doubt about the effectiveness of public?Cprivate partnerships as valid formulas to reduce political manipulation. It also questions the ability of matching grant programs to reach the areas where public resources are most needed.     

Management response to the demands of global fresh fruit markets: Rewarding harvesters with financial incentives

Competition in global fresh fruit markets is now much more intense than a decade ago. Producers and exporters face an increasing number of quality requirements and regulations that are costly and challenge established practices: paying harvesters by the amount they harvest and trying to control quality with sanctions. Based on a field study, this article discusses how lemon producers in northern Argentina are responding to these challenges; why some have responded only by introducing non-contractual innovations, while others by rewarding harvesters for careful performance to insure fruit quality. The findings elucidate arguments about the instrumentality of transaction costs on the choice of both managerial practices and forms of remunerating labourers. It also illustrates that added quality demands of foreign markets eased the task of harvesters, but had a varying effect on labourers' income.     

Migration and Distributive Politics: The Political Economy of Mexico's 3 × 1 Program

Mexico's 3 × 1 Program for Migrants is a matching grant scheme that seeks to direct the money sent by migrant organizations abroad to the provision of public and social infrastructure and to productive projects in migrants’ communities of origin. To this end, the municipal, state, and federal administrations match the amount sent by hometown associations by 3 to 1. This article explores the impact on the operation of the 3 × 1 of a particular facet of Mexican political life: its recent democratization and the increasing political fragmentation at the municipal level. The study finds a lower provision of public projects in jurisdictions where a high number of political parties compete. This finding casts doubt on the claim that policy interventions such as the 3 × 1 Program actually improve local public goods provision at the local level under increasing political competition.     

A bibliometric review of the technology transfer literature

The Journal of Technology Transfer - This study explores academic research on technology transfer (TT) and the related themes. The TT field has attracted considerable scholarly attention in recent...     

A case of self-inflicted wounding by the introduction of needles through the abdominal wall to induce abortion

The self-inflicted wounding of a 23-year-old woman who introduced needles through the abdominal wall to induce abortion is reported. The woman first came to hospital with metrorrhagia and pain in the right iliac fossa. Initially she refused treatment and went home. Twenty-two hours later she was admitted to hospital after giving birth at home to a male fetus of 610 g. The placenta was expelled in the hospital and a sewing needle was found. Lateral and anteroposterior radiographs revealed 15 such needles in the hypogastric region, most of them at subcutaneous level. The newborn was admitted to the intensive care unit in a generally poor condition, with hypothermia, cyanosis and bradycardia. An X-ray showed a metallic object in the abdominal region which, again, corresponded to a sewing needle. The newborn did not respond to treatment and died 2h after admission.