The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public

The Holocaust has become an important part of the everyday discourse of American life. Indeed, it has become one of the central historical analogies for thinking about U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. The received wisdom about the Holocaust among most Americans is that the United States and the rest of the civilized world turned away Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany before World War II, and then sat idly by while the Third Reich murdered nearly 6 million of them during the course of the war. In light of this reprehensible indifference, the United States shares some responsibility for the Holocaust, and it must “never again” allow large numbers of people to be slaughtered because of their race, ethnicity, or religion. Historical analogies are ubiquitous in foreign policy debates. Not only do they routinely shape state behavior, they usually do so for the worse. Hence, we should be wary of all historical analogies and examine them carefully to make sure they are based on sound history and used wisely by policymakers. The widely accepted Holocaust analogy illustrates, in my view, both how analogies are frequently based on a faulty reading of history and that policies based on them have not always served U.S. interests.     

Uncertainty and the Prevalence of Committee Outliers

Political scientists often suppose that the informational model of legislative organization predicts an absence of committee outliers. In fact, the model predicts that committee outliers will be more common when the floor is more uncertain than its committees. Data limitations have largely prevented testing this uncertainty‐outlier prediction, until now. For this article, I investigated whether or not the informational model correctly predicts under what scenarios outliers will be more frequent. As predicted, more uncertainty is associated with more committee outliers in U.S. state legislatures. Legislatures in which the floor is less informed than the committees are more likely to have committee outliers.     

DETERRENCE AND MORAL PERSUASION EFFECTS ON CORPORATE TAX COMPLIANCE: FINDINGS FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL*

Previous studies on tax compliance have focused primarily on the tax‐reporting behavior of individuals. This study reports results from a randomized field test of the effects of deterrence and moral persuasion on the tax‐reporting behavior of 4,395 corporations in Israel. Two experimental groups received tax letters, one conveying a deterrent message and the other a moral persuasion message. Three types of measures are used to evaluate compliance based on the magnitude of the difference‐in‐differences of means in 1) gross sales values reported to the authority, 2) tax dollars paid to the authority, and 3) tax deductions. Overall, both deterrence and moral persuasion approaches do not produce statistically significant greater compliance compared with control conditions. These results do not support the ability of a policy of sending tax letters to increase substantively the reporting of true tax liability or tax payments by corporations. However, these results also show that moral persuasion can be counterproductive: Corporations in this experimental group show an increase rather than a decrease in tax deductions, which translates into loss of state revenues. The implications for theory, research, and tax policy are discussed.     

Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint

This paper addresses the contradictory results obtained by Segal (1997) and Spiller and Gely (1992) concerning the impact of institutional constraints on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision making. By adapting the Spiller and Gely maximum likelihood model to the Segal dataset, we find support for the hypothesis that the Court adjusts its decisions to presidential and congressional preferences. Data from 1947 to 1992 indicate that the average probability of the Court being constrained has been approximately one‐third. Further, we show that the results obtained by Segal are the product of biases introduced by a misspecified econometric model. We also discuss how our estimation highlights the usefulness of Krehbiel's model of legislative decision making.     

Party Pressure in the U.S. State Legislatures

We extend Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart's (2001) method of measuring party influence over roll‐call voting to the comparative state legislative context. Examining 27 state lower chambers, we find that overall parties exert detectable influence on 44% of all roll calls and 69% of close votes, but that the incidence of party influence varies strongly across chambers. Taking advantage of the comparative leverage the state context brings, we find that party influence responds significantly to measures of legislative careerism and state socioeconomic diversity, with majority size playing some role. The effect of preference polarization is complicated and conditioned by challenges facing the legislature, and we find results both challenging and conditionally supporting the conditional party government account.     

The Logic of Legislative Leadership: Preferences,Challenges, and the Speaker's Powers

Principal agent theory implies that legislators will delegate power to a leader only when they need the leader's help and the leader can be expected to provide satisfactory help if granted power. This study is the first to evaluate the implied interaction between legislators' need for help and the degree to which legislators and leaders have similar preferences. By analyzing the Speaker's powers in the U.S. states, I arrived at three key conclusions. First, institutional leadership power responds to the interaction between preference alignment and policymaking challenges. Traditionally expected effects only appear when both alignment and challenges are relatively high. Second, professionalization causes weaker leadership powers. Finally, electoral competition correlates with stronger appointment, committee, and resource powers, but weaker procedural powers.     

We Can Work with Hamas

Just as the Arab Spring blossomed, the al‐Qaeda‐led era of terrorism came to an end with the killing of Osama Bin Laden in his Pakistani lair by American special forces. We asked two of the most contentious experts on all things Islamic—Ayaan Hirsi Ali and Tariq Ramadan—to assess the meaning of these historic moments on the future. Amr Moussa, the leading candidate for Egypt's presidency, and Ehud Barak, Israel's defense minister, also offer their views. Two top former intelligence agents from MI6 and the CIA look at the next turn of events—the Saudi counter‐revolution.