BETWEEN PROPORTIONALITY & IMPUNITY: Confrontation⇒ Truth⇒ Prevention

The ideal of punishment proportionate to wrongdoing creates a criminal justice system that deters prevention. An alternative ideal is that crime should always be confronted with a presumption for mercy that is conditional upon participation in a truth-seeking process that identifies paths to prevention. Informally rewarding reconciliation and prevention is the basis of a more compelling rational choice account of crime control than proportionate formal punishment. A rational and emotionally intelligent criminal justice system might look something like the airline safety system.     

An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies

A variety of multivariate techniques were used to develop a taxonomy of regulatory agencies from the first comprehensive study of the disparate enforcement strategies employed by business regulatory agencies in one country. Seven types of agencies were identified: Conciliators, Benign Big Guns, Diagnostic Inspectorates, Detached Token Enforcers, Detached Modest Enforcers, Token Enforcers and Modest Enforcers. Agencies were distinguished primarily according to their orientation to enforcement versus persuasion, according to their commitment to detached (or arms length) command and control regulation versus cooperative fostering of self-regulation, and according to their attachment to universalistic rulebook regulation versus particularistic regulation. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to view regulatory agencies as lying on a single continuum from particularistic non-enforcers who engage in cooperative fostering of self-regulation to rulebook enforcers whose policy is detached command and control. This approximates the suggestions of Hawkins and Reiss for distinguishing regulatory agencies according to a "sanctioning/deterrence" versus "compliance" dimension. The predominant regulatory style in Australia, however, is distant from both poles, being a perfunctory regulatory approach which is neither distinctively diagnostic and educative nor litigiously "going by the book"; rather it amounts to "going through the motions". The typology also partially conforms to Black's categorisation of social control as penal, therapeutic, conciliatory and compensatory.     

TARGET CHOICE DURING EXTREME EVENTS: A DISCRETE SPATIAL CHOICE MODEL OF THE 2011 LONDON RIOTS

Riots are extreme events, and much of the early research on rioting suggested that the decision making of rioters was far from rational and could only be understood from the perspective of a collective mind. In the current study, we derive and test a set of expectations regarding rioter spatial decision making developed from theories originally intended to explain patterns of urban crime when law and order prevail—crime pattern and social disorganization theory—and consider theories of collective behavior and contagion. To do this, we use data for all riot‐related incidents that occurred in London in August 2011 that were detected by the police. Unlike most studies of victimization, we use a random utility model to examine simultaneously how the features of the destinations selected by rioters, the origins of their journeys, and the characteristics of the offenders influence offender spatial decision making. The results demonstrate that rioter target choices were far from random and provide support for all three types of theory, but for crime pattern theory in particular. For example, rioters were more likely to engage in the disorder close to their home location and to select areas that contained routine activity nodes and transport hubs, and they were less likely to cross the Thames River. In terms of contagion, rioters were found to be more likely to target areas that had experienced rioting in the previous 24 hours. From a policy perspective, the findings provide insight into the types of areas that may be most vulnerable during riots and why this is the case, and when particular areas are likely to be at an elevated risk of this type of disorder.     

The Australian Government's Affirmative Action Legislation: Achieving Social Change Through Human Resource Management*

Data from the Affirmative Action Agency Public Reports and the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey were used to review progress in the implementation of the Australian Government's Affirmative Action legislation and to examine the relationship between following mandatory procedures and achieving outcomes that impact positively on women's workforce experiences. The data suggest that while a relationship exists at the bivariate level, it becomes considerably weaker when organizational and workforce characteristics are controlled. The variables that emerged from the analyses as strong predictors of both procedural compliance and the adoption of accommodating practices for women centered around human resource management. Where companies were committed to human resource management, both procedural compliance and accommodating practices tended to be high. These data demonstrate the importance of linking legislation for social change with workplace functions, particularly when resistance to the legislation is high and capacity to enforce is low.     

The Limits of the Economic Analysis of Regulation: An Empirical Case and a Case for Empiricism*

Can the tools of the economic analysis of law be used to identify the optimal level of stringency in regulatory standards? Data on the costs of nursing home regulatory compliance suggest that in this domain such models could only produce wildly false estimates of the optimal level of stringency. Among the reasons for this are that: (a) actual costs of compliance explain only 19 percent of the variance in the subjectively expected costs that should inform rational choices; and (b) while there is a powerful effect of expected cost on compliance disaggregated by standard, this is not a monotonic increasing effect but a parabolic relationship. The reason for the finding that almost half the nursing homes lie on the wrong side of the turning point of this parabola is that these homes tend to be run by managers who are “disengagers” from the regulatory culture. Their behavior is not to be understood in terms of rational game playing but in terms of dropping out of the regulatory game. The disengagers are in the regulatory system but not of it and certainly not economically calculative about it.     

CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORIES AND REGULATORY COMPLIANCE*

Four traditional criminological theories—opportunity, control, subcultural, and differential association—are tested for their explanatory power in accounting for organizational compliance with regulatory laws. The primary data source is interviews with 410 chief executives of small organizations. Partial support is found for each theory; certain key concepts of each theory have a significant effect on regulatory compliance, net of a variety of characteristics of the nursing home, the residents in the home, and the inspection team. The results show that blocked legitimate opportunity has a significant effect on regulatory compliance, as does the structure of illegitimate opportunity. There is also an effect on compliance of participation in business subcultures of resistance to regulation. Belief in laws increases compliance with those laws as does differential association with or attachment to the upholders of the law. Overall, however, control theory and differential association lack explanatory power, and the explanatory power of subcultural theory is modest. Only opportunity theory explains a credible proportion of variance in compliance as a standalone theory. The significant effect of some but not all of the measures for each theory, coupled with the lack of significant explanatory power by three of the four theories, suggests the need for theoretical integration.     

REINTEGRATIVE SHAMING AND COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY STANDARDS*

Australian nursing home inspection teams are partitioned into those with an enforcement ideology supportive of reintegrative shaming, those who believe in being tolerant and understanding when confronted with noncompliance with the law, and those with a more stigmatizing ideology toward noncompliers. Nursing homes visited by teams with a reintegrative shaming ideology display significantly improved compliance in the period following the inspection. Nursing homes visited by inspection teams with a more stigmatizing attitude toward noncompliance display an approximately equal drop in compliance. The performance of homes visited by tolerant and understanding inspection teams falls between these two extremes. A more specific test of the theory shows that when interdependency exists between the nursing home and the inspection team, reintegrative shaming has a stronger positive effect on improving compliance. In nursing homes with no link between the home and the inspection team, reintegrative shaming has no effect on compliance levels. These effects demonstrate both the importance and the limitations of reintegrative shaming as a theoretical concept worthy of further empirical investigation.     

Regulatory Styles,Motivational Postures and Nursing Home Compliance*

Using Kagan and Scholz (1984) typology of regulatory noncompliance, this study examined the perceptions of regulators and of regulatees toward the regulatory encounter to predict subsequent compliance with nursing home quality of care standards. Appraisals of both regulators and regulatees were not driven by motivational analyses of each other's actions, but rather by assessments of performance and social group identity. The regulators saw nursing homes in terms of one evaluative dimension ranging from responsible and not in need of intervention through to irresponsible and needing intervention. The corresponding reactions of nursing home managers involved seeing the regulators as cooperative and sympathetic through to police-like and coercive. On both sides of the regulatory encounter, criticism and reactions to criticism swamped nuanced analyses of motivational underpinnings and rational decision models in explaining compliance. The motivational complexity underlying the Kagan and Scholz typology was, however, apparent in the self-reported motivational postures of managers toward the regulatory process. The postures of managerial accommodation and capture to the regulatory culture were associated with compliance. Over time, resisters to the new regulatory regime became more compliant, particularly those whom inspectors judged as best left alone to adjust. In contrast were managers whose response to the regulatory process was disengagement. Their organizations experienced deterioration in compliance. The study fails to find that certain kinds of regulatory strategies such as deterrence, education and persuasion work better than others across the sample or with specific groups. Extant models focus excessively on how to play the regulatory game without recognizing the potential for players dropping out of the game. Understanding reasons for disengagement and processes for reengagement are fundamental to the application of behavioral decision theory models to the regulatory context.