“It Takes a Coalition”: Coalition Potential and Legislative Decision Making

This article empirically illustrates the value of coalition formation in legislative bargaining. I argue that legislators’ potential to form powerful coalitions, their coalition potential, is essential to their ability to obtain preferred policy outcomes. Using data on the European Union's legislative process, I show that coalition potential significantly increases legislators’ success. Moreover, the value of coalition potential depends on the voting rules used to pass legislation. For example, under the unanimity voting rule, the importance of coalition potential is insignificant because of the veto power held by each legislator.     

ENTREPRENEURIAL LEADERSHIP IN THE ENGLISH PUBLIC SECTOR: PARADOX OR POSSIBILITY?

Our study explores the possibility for the enactment of entrepreneurial leadership in the English public sector under the Labour government’s modernization agenda. To substantiate our analysis, we draw upon data gathered from leaders in three public sector arenas – the National Health Service, secondary schools, and further education (FE) colleges. Our study proposes a definition of public sector entrepreneurship that extends beyond existing literature. In essence, we contend that public sector entrepreneurship is characterized by the combination of three distinct agencies: ‘stakeholder’, ‘entrepreneurial’ and ‘political’. The public sector entrepreneur identifies market opportunities within the political landscape, optimizes the performance‐enhancing potential of innovation for the public sector organization, and carries stakeholders in a way that both permits risk and recognizes the stewardship of public sector resources.