FRAGMENTED OR CONNECTIVE PROFESSIONALISM? STRATEGIES FOR PROFESSIONALIZING THE WORK OF STRATEGISTS AND OTHER (ORGANIZATIONAL) PROFESSIONALS

Many professionals, especially organizational ones (managers, controllers, strategists), face difficulties in organizing their professional fields. Work ambiguities and dependencies on outsiders make it difficult to set homogeneous standards and shelter occupational domains. Professionalism tends to be fragmented. It is questionable, however, whether professionalization is a matter of either enforced regulation or fragmented regulatory forms. More connective forms of professional control might enable groups to establish professional domains, despite ambiguities and dependencies. In order to understand professionalization dynamics in public domains and the relevance of connective professionalism, we study the development of one particular field, strategists in government. We show that the professionalization of Dutch strategists is fragmented: strategists are a varied and mobile group; they have different ideas about work; they depend on many other actors and factors. We also show that strategists opt for either more enforced forms of professionalism, or less professional control. Finally, we show how they might establish connective professionalism. By enacting embedded work spaces, strategists can reconfigure their work. This is also relevant for other (organizational) professionals.     

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMMES: A FUZZY SET QUALITATIVE COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Voluntary Environmental Programmes (VEPs) have become increasingly popular in addressing environmental risks. While VEPs have attracted much scholarly attention, little is known about how they achieve their outcomes. This article seeks to better understand whether and how the roles of governments in VEPs affect their outcomes in terms of (1) attracting participants, and (2) their contribution to a desired collective end. Using fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), this article addresses a series of 31 VEPs in the building sectors of Australia, the Netherlands, and the United States. Of particular interest is a better understanding of what configurations of five specific governmental roles in VEPs are sufficient to attract participants and contribute to a desired collective end. Three ideal type roles for governments in VEPs, that are positively related to the two outcomes under scrutiny, are uncovered, and the article concludes with lessons on how governments may be best involved in VEPs.     

Immigration, Europe and the 'new' cultural dimension

Kriesi et al. announced the birth of a new cleavage in contemporary Western Europe, one dividing the winners and losers of globalisation. Their studies in 2006 and 2008 contain analyses of party positions in six countries, based on the contents of editorial sections of newspapers. This article challenges the main conclusion of Kriesi et al. by demonstrating − on the basis of two expert surveys − that party positions are mainly structured by one dimension. The structure detected by Kriesi et al. in their analysis of parties is not found, except concerning voter positions. A consequence of this article's findings is that large groups of citizens are not represented by any parties, in particular those who are left-wing on socio-economic issues and right-wing on cultural issues. The article in its conclusion discusses possible causes for the differences between these findings and those of Kriesi et al., and the implications of these findings for democratic representation.     

European Community politics and electoral representation: Evidence from the 1989 European Elections Study

Abstract: In spite of the fact that the European elections were, in most countries, not fought over the issue of Community building and European integration, this article shows that only a few parties take positions towards the Community which are clearly out of line with the average position of their voters. The parties involved are the orthodox-Protestant combination in the Netherlands, the Workers Party in Ireland, the Italian MSI, and the greens in Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Luxembourg. The discrepancies between these parties'positions and the attitudes of their electorates - in combination with their generally successful electoral performance - underscores what is known from other analyses: Parties do not acquire votes on the basis of European issue concerns, but on the basis of national political concerns. The result of the European elections may still, however, be considered as an ex post facto , endorsement and legitimation of parties'policies towards European integration.     

European parties' performance in electoral competition

Abstract: This article focuses on competition for votes between parties, as it existed in Western Europe in the period of the direct election to the European Parliament in 1989. Following earlier research by Van der Eijk and Niemöller, an instrument is introduced to measure the probability of party choice of EC citizens which establishes the likelihood of respondents to vote for any of the nationally relevant options/parties. A number of substantive conclusions about political parties'competitive performance result from this research. First, a single mechanism seems to structure electoral competition in all EC member-countries. Second, the competitive performance of political parties is not affected by their governmental status, their ideological position, and the degree of politicisation of the electoral environment. And third, parties'competitive performance is strongly affected by the degree of uniqueness of their electoral potential, their mobilising capacities, their ideological extremity and their sheer size.     

Chile's (Inter)National Identities: Framing the Relations with Bolivia and Peru

National identities play a significant role in Latin American international relations. They affect the ways in which policy‐makers view themselves and others, as well as influencing the ways in which their policies are ‘received’ abroad. In this way, identities create opportunities and constraints for foreign policy‐making, framing the relations between Latin American countries. The author argues that, since 1990, three main patterns of Chilean identity recently affected the country's relations with its northern neighbours Bolivia and Peru: a ‘neoliberal identity’, a ‘legalistic identity’ and a ‘progressive identity’. These three patterns of identity have created opportunities for cooperation as well as causes for conflict.     

On Law and Morality. A Dialogue

Abstract. The dialogue focusses on the distinctions and connections between law and morality. Morality is seen as axiological in character, whereas law is deontological. The possibility of a conceptual tie between goodness (axiology) and duty (deontology) is firmly disputed. Habermas's discursive foundation of ethics is criticized because it seems to confer on moral principles the status of a priori synthetic truths. Every moral idea has a cultural relativity which is not taken into account by Habermasian dialogue ethics. The moral and the legal points of view are kept separate: A law which does not satisfy the requirements of a "minimum content" of natural law is not said to be "law," but simply falling short of moral criteria. The possibility of introducing rational guarantees into moral discourse is not denied, but doubt remains as to whether there are "right answers" to moral questions.     

If You Want a Middle Class Keep Your Industrial Base

The future of the European Union has never been more in doubt than at the very moment it has been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its historical accomplishments. When the heads of Europe's weakest institutions—the Commission, the Council and the Parliament—collected the prize in Oslo on December 10, 2012 they spotlighted the nub of the problem. Unless these institutions can garner the legitimacy of European citizens and transform into a real federal union with common fiscal and economic policies to complement the single currency, Europe will remain at the mercy of global financial markets and the fiscally authoritarian dictates of its strongest state, Germany. Moving beyond this state of affairs was the focus of a recent “town hall” gathering in Berlin sponsored by the Berggruen Institute on Governance. The meeting brought together current power brokers—such as the contending voices of German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble and French Finance Minister Pierre Moscovici, who rarely appear in public together—as well as Europe's top former leaders, key thinkers and young people who will govern in the future. The peace‐building project of the European Union was born out of the ashes of World War II and the anguish of the Cold War. Yet, as George Soros points out, its current inability to resolve the eurocrisis by forging greater union is dividing Europe once again, this time between creditors and debtors. Former Greek premier George Papandreou has warned that this division is fomenting a new politics of fear that is giving rise to the same kind of xenophobic movements that fueled the extreme politics of the Nazi era. To avoid a repeat of the last calamitous century, Europe first of all needs a growth strategy both to escape the “debt trap” it is in—and which austerity alone will only deepen—and to create breathing space for the tough structural reforms that can make Europe as a whole competitive again in a globalized world. To sustain reform, it needs a clear path to legitimacy for the institutions that must govern a federal Europe. The proof that Europe can escape its crisis through a combination of growth, fiscal discipline and structural reform comes from the one country so many want to keep out of the union: Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan rightfully boasts of Turkey's accomplishments that resulted from the difficult changes carried out after its crisis in 2001—ranging from quickly cleaning up the banks to liberalizing markets to trimming social benefits to make them more affordable in the long run. As a result, Turkey today is the fastest growing economy in the world alongside China with diminished deficit and debt levels that meet the eurozone criteria that many members states themselves cannot today meet. Turkey has even offered a 5 billion euro credit through the IMF for financial aid to Europe. Germany itself also provides some lessons for the rest of Europe. The obvious reason Germany rules today is because it is the most globally competitive country in the European Union. That is the result of a series of reforms that were implemented starting in 2003 under the leadership of then‐chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Aimed a bolstering Germany's industrial base and its collateral small and medium enterprises which are the foundation of its middle class society, those reforms introduced more labor flexibility and trimmed benefits to make them sustainably affordable while investing in training, maintaining skills and research and development. Even if Europe's individual nation states can shrink imbalances by following Turkey and Germany in getting their act together, the only ultimate way to save the euro, and thus Europe itself, is to build the complementary governing institutions at the European level. For those institutions to become effective, they must be empowered and legitimated by European citizens themselves. To this end, Tony Blair has suggested a bold move: the direct election of a European president. Symbolically, the Oslo ceremonies were a historical turning point for Europe. By recognizing the European Union's peace‐making past, the Nobel Prize challenged Europe to escape once and for all the destructive pull of narrow national interests and passions.     

Degrees of influence: Educational inequality in policy representation

Education plays an important role in the political, social and economic divisions that have recently characterised Western Europe. Despite the many analyses of education and its political consequences, however, previous research has not investigated whether government policy caters more to the preferences of the higher educated than to the preferences of the lower educated. We address this question using an original dataset of public opinion and government policy in the Netherlands. This data reveals that policy representation is starkly unequal. The association between support for policy change and actual change is much stronger for highly educated citizens than for low and middle educated citizens, and only the highly educated appear to have any independent influence on policy. This inequality extends to the economic and cultural dimensions of political competition. Our findings have major implications for the educational divide in Western Europe, as they reflect both a consequence and cause of this divide.