Punishing corporate criminals with restraint

This article is a revised version of a paper originally written for, and presented at, the eighth international conference of the Society for the Reform of Criminal Law, Hong Kong, December 4–8, 1994. Parts have been published in Don Stuart,Canadian Criminal Law 575-91 (3d ed. 1995).     

The R and D contract and democratic theory

The purposes of this essay are to describe how federal research and development policy has altered authority relationships and to suggest a new concept of legitimacy in accord with the changed conditions. Research and development (R and D) creates an indeterminate future. Thus, the politics of research and development incorporates an apparent contradiction : political leadership demands that jobs be done which require creative and unpredictable actions on the part of private organizations, while it also demands that contractors be held responsible for fulfilling goals efficiently, avoiding deleterious secondary consequences, and refraining from abuses of power. The paradox can be resolved by creating norms of responsibility that allow for judgments on how a job is done rather than what is to be done. New institutions for technological assessment to check on unintended consequences of projects and citizen review boards to estimate the quality of life engendered by projects may provide such norms of responsibility.     

Local planners — global constraints

A number of reports have been published over the past few years documenting the evidence of decline in the northeastern U.S.A. and the simultaneous migration of industry to the U.S. Sunbelt. (Academy for Contemporary Problems, 1977; Sale, 1975; Sternlieb and Hughes, 1975). In developing appropriate recommendations to planners, such studies invariably urge that localities or regions facing industrial out-migration arrest this activity by making themselves more suitable and attractive (Council for Northeast Economic Action [CNEA], 1977a) within the framework of a number of characteristic strategies. We propose to examine critically some of the traditional strategies recommended by these reports.     

Competition in political and economic markets

Prepared as a response to Frey and Eichenberger's Anomalies in Political Economy. We thank Gordon Tullock for helpful discussions. This work was partially supported by the Taylor Experimental Laboratory at Washington University.     

Attitudes of Canadians toward affirmative action: Opposition,value pluralism,and nonattitudes

Set against a backdrop of current public policy and case law, this study investigates Canadian attitudes toward affirmative action among both citizens and decision makers. We find low levels of support for such programs across a variety of contexts and intended beneficiaries, but we also discover that opinion on both sides of the issue is rather soft, for large portions of those taking positions on the matter are willing to reconsider their views when prompted. We interpret this finding as an indication of what Philip Converse has called nonattitudes. Thus, a substantial portion of Canadians appear to hold no genuine attitudes on the question of affirmative action and are relatively open to persuasion. In contrast, the preferences of those with stable attitudes are rooted in the tradeoff between values of equality and merit. Implications for policy activists in this issue area are discussed.The research reported here is part of a large project supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (Grant No. 411-85-001). The Centre of Criminology at the University of Toronto has provided a home, and indispensable support, for the Charter Project. This research was also facilitated by a contribution from the Solicitor General of Canada to the Centre of Criminology, University of Toronto. Our thanks also go to Robert Vipond for his help in clarifying our concepts.     

Executive capacity to control legislatures and presidential choice of cabinet ministers in East Asian democracies

How do presidents in new democracies choose cabinet ministers to accomplish their policy goals? Contrary to existing studies explaining the partisan composition of the cabinet with institutional characteristics, such as formal authority, we argue that the broader political context surrounding the president's ability to control the legislature can affect cabinet partisanship. By analyzing original data on cabinet formation in all presidential systems in East Asia since democratization, we find that when presidents are more likely to be dominant in executive–legislative relations, they have less concern about legislative support and more leeway to focus on policy performance by appointing nonpartisan cabinet members. This analysis suggests that understanding cabinet partisanship requires a view of cabinet appointments as a trade‐off between securing legislative support and managing policy performance, and the scope of this compromise depends on the strength of the president vis‐à‐vis the legislature.