Broadcasting system in Italy: Evolution and perspectives

Italian public broadcasting service (RAI) has had a monopoly until the middle of the 1970s. The peculiarity of public monopoly in broadcasting is its tendency to secure political rather than economic rents. The dangers that public monopoly causes to consumers (viewers-listeners), has not emerged at least until the mid-seventies for the simple reason that broadcasting has been conceived under the ideological umbrella of public good rather than in terms of opportunity costs. A law limiting monopoly has taken fourteen years to be passed so that the proliferation of private radio and television stations has orgininated the subrogatory intervention by the Constitutional Court. From 1975 to 1989 regulation has tended to perpetuate RAI's monopoly, in a context which was very different from the one in which the RAI was established. It is no wonder, therefore, that reforms have been motivated by RAI's financial crisis in the seventies and eighties, and not by political choices. The 1990 law puts a stop to public monopoly in broadcasting giving rise to what now appears to be a duopoly, but which in 1990 to many seemed to introduce a contestable market able to respond to both consumers' demand and technological innovations more efficiently, so ensuring more freedom of information.     

From subjectivism to constitutionalism: the intellectual journey of James M. Buchanan through his Italian heroes

Quack medicines were prepackaged, commercially marketed medicinal concoctions brewed from “secret recipes” that often contained powerful drugs. Governmental regulation of them in late nineteenth-century England is heralded as a landmark of public health policy. We argue that it’s instead a landmark of medicinal rent-seeking. We develop a theory of quack medicine regulation in Victorian England according to which health professionals faced growing competition from close substitutes: quack medicine vendors. To protect their rents, health professionals organized, lobbied, and won laws granting them a monopoly over the sale of “poisonous” medicaments, most notably, quack medicines.

     

How to make a dis-entrepreneur of the Schumpeterian entrepreneur: the impact of institutional settings on growth

Fiscal and monetary institutions are conspicuously omitted in the conventional theory of long-run economic growth. Moving from the Schumpeterian entrepreneur, who adopts new technology because its value, according to Tobin’s q, dominates the economic rents of existing capital, we argue that the Schumpeterian entrepreneur’s incentives to innovate change when he is transplanted into the public economy. We analyze two alternative institutional settings denoted as “long chain” and “short chain”. Through the “long chain” model we show that the Schumpeterian entrepreneur is driven towards “destructive creation” of new capital, thus becoming a political dis-entrepreneur, while the quasi-contractual “short chain” model provides incentives to innovate.     

Contractual Fiscal Equivalence Versus Geographical Fiscal Equivalence

This work extends the contractual procedure, normally used in therelationships among persons, to intergovernmental relationshipsnamely those among local jurisdictions. This changing inperspective challenges the efficiency criterion based ongeographical fiscal equivalence; in fact the level of equilibriumdoes not depend on the level of the public good provided perse; it rather depends on the fiscal system, on the position ofthe median voter, on whether interjurisdictional mobility iseither favoured or forbidden, and finally on whether the centralgovernment uses transfers either for redistributive purposes oras payments of the services provided by local jurisdictions. Inparticular, the paper shows that if two jurisdictions of the samelevel are allowed to have contractual relationships (horizontalrelationships) the more efficient of the two can sell the servicealso to the less efficient, so reducing citizens' unit costs.     

A profile of the Italian state Audit Court: An agent in search of a resolute principal

The Italian Court of Accounts has a long and well documented history, but its functions are limited and not clearly revealed from analysis of the historical record. However, the institutional background of the Italian case is vital for understanding the notion that an agent due to the function he has been assigned, is in search of his principal. This article offers historical and institutional documentation on which a theoretical analysis can be built.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Dura lex,sed lex</Emphasis>? Insights from the subjective theory of opportunity cost

Seeking a grounding in Buchanan (Cost and choice: an inquiry in economic theory, 1969) subjective theory of opportunity cost, this paper sets out to fix a notional locus of the law in order to determine the cost of law enforcement. The paper also explores the impact of unlawful activities on the economy and analyses the evolution of individual criminal activities in collective criminal organizations such as the mafia.