Metric forensic anthropology decisions: Reliability and biasability of sectioning-point-based sex estimates

Subjective decisions make human cognitive processes more susceptible to bias and error. Specifically, research indicates that additional context biases forensic anthropologists’ morphological analyses. To address whether metric analyses are also subject to bias, we conducted a pilot study in which 52 experienced osteologists measured a difficult-to-classify human femur, with or without additional contextual information. Using a metric sectioning-point sex-estimation method, participants provided a sex estimate for individual skeletal element(s) and, when given multiple elements, the combined skeletal assemblage. Control group participants (n = 24) measured only the femur. In addition to the femur, bias group participants (n = 28) either measured a female humerus and viewed a female-biasing photograph (n = 14) or measured a male humerus and viewed a male-biasing photograph (n = 14). We explored whether the experts in the different groups would differ in: (1) femoral measurements; (2) femoral sex-estimation conclusions; and (3) final sex-estimation conclusions for the skeletal assemblage. Although the femoral measurements and femoral sex estimates were comparable across groups, the overall sex estimates in the female-biased group were impacted by contextual information—differing from both the control and male-biased groups (p < 0.001). Our results demonstrate that cognitive bias can occur even in metric sex-estimation conclusions. Specifically, this occurred when the metric data and single-element sex estimates were synthesized into an overall estimate. Thus, our results suggest that metric methods are most vulnerable to bias when data are synthesized into an overall conclusion, highlighting the need for bias countermeasures and comprehensive statistical frameworks for synthesizing metric data to mitigate the effects of cognitive bias.     

Observer determination of the make,model, and year of questioned vehicles

Often, criminal acts involving a vehicle are caught on digital video surveillance systems. While potentially useful for an investigation, the recording conditions are typically less than optimal for the extraction of key information for the identification of the perpetrator, such as a license plate. Providing the make, model and year of a questioned vehicle is a common request for examiners, to narrow the field of potential suspect vehicles. This study seeks to compare the performance of a nonpeer-reviewed make, model, and year determination between two separate groups, specifically, trained forensic image examiners and nontrained individuals. Results show that even with varied image capture conditions and quality, the trained forensic image examiners more correctly and completely identified the test group of questioned vehicles make, model, and year.     

What do forensic analysts consider relevant to their decision making?

In response to research demonstrating that irrelevant contextual information can bias forensic science analyses, authorities have increasingly urged laboratories to limit analysts' access to irrelevant and potentially biasing information (Dror and Cole (2010) [3]; National Academy of Sciences (2009) [18]; President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (2016) [22]; UK Forensic Science Regulator (2015) [26]). However, a great challenge in implementing this reform is determining which information is task-relevant and which is task-irrelevant. In the current study, we surveyed 183 forensic analysts to examine what they consider relevant versus irrelevant in their forensic analyses. Results revealed that analysts generally do not regard information regarding the suspect or victim as essential to their analytic tasks. However, there was significant variability among analysts within and between disciplines. Findings suggest that forensic science disciplines need to agree on what they regard as task-relevant before context management procedures can be properly implemented. The lack of consensus about what is relevant information not only leaves room for biasing information, but also reveals foundational gaps in what analysts consider crucial in forensic decision making.     

War-Power Reform in Australia: (Re)considering the Options

The decision to go to war in Australia remains the prerogative of the Executive. The lack of parliamentary authorisation of perhaps the most significant decision a democracy can make has seen sustained, but unsuccessful, efforts to reform legislation. In the wake of the costly invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003, repeated calls for legislative reform of Australia's war powers have failed to find traction amongst Coalition and Australian Labor Party (ALP) leadership. Lamenting the lack of transparency and accountability in the current system, those favouring legislative reform would see authorisation of combat missions placed in the hands of Parliament. However, given the lack of support from either of the major parties, any legislative reform remains unlikely. Given this impasse, this article argues that a compromise option, in the form of a new war-powers convention, may be a small step towards democratising the decision of going to war. While not legally binding, this constitutional convention would represent an agreement by the major parties that overseas combat operations will be properly debated in Parliament.     

Designing a Choice Architecture for Regulators

The emergence of behavioral public administration has led to increasing calls for public managers and policy makers to consider predictable cognitive biases when regulating individual behaviors or market transactions. Recognizing that cognitive biases can also affect the regulators themselves, this article attempts to understand how the institutional environment in which regulators operate interacts with their cognitive biases. In other words, to what extent does the “choice architecture” that regulators face reinforce or counteract predictable cognitive biases? Just as knowledge of behavioral insights can help regulators design a choice architecture that frames individual decisions to encourage welfare-enhancing choices, it may help governments understand and design institutions to counter cognitive biases in regulators that contribute to deviations from public interest policies. From these observations, the article offers some modest suggestions for improving the regulatory choice architecture.     

Defense Industries and Global Dependency

The global defense industrial sector is a remarkably accurate indicator of the distribution of power in the post-Cold War international system. However, the defense industrial sector as a policy tool has received relatively little scrutiny, even though it not only reflects the international order, but also provides the United States with the ability to influence the foreign policy behavior of other states. The defense industrial sector is a powerful, if undervalued, diplomatic tool in the United States’ political arsenal.     

REACH: A Step Change in the Management of Chemicals

The EU has regulated chemicals since the late 1960s using both general and sectoral legislation, and exposure-based, hazard-based and risk-based decisions. A new proposal from the European Commission – on the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) – will build on the experiences of the existing legislation and introduce some new concepts in the management of chemicals. This article is aimed at assessing the current chemical control mechanisms in the EU and those put forward in REACH to demonstrate how REACH is a new paradigm in chemicals management. REACH will carry forward today's experience and approach to the management of chemicals in the EU and introduces some novel aspects, such as utilizing market-based mechanisms and putting into operation the 'substitution principle'.     

RICO: The genesis of an idea

In 1970, the Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act. Title IX of the 1970 Act is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act or RICO. This Act had its origins in legislation going back as far as 1934, but coming forward to 1961. The 1970 Act borrowed ideas from this earlier legislation, principally “enterprise,” but also the use predicate statutes to define “racketeering activity.” The ideas are not new, but their combination affects how prosecutors and law enforcement agents investigate, try, and sanction violations of the Act. RICO’s drafting also reflects organizational theory and economic analysis. The investigation and prosecution of a single crime committed by an individual on a single day and in a single place maybe done using one set of procedural and evidentiary rules. Nevertheless, the investigation and prosecution of patterns of diverse offenses committed by, through, and against licit and illicit enterprises require sophisticated procedures, evidentiary rules, and criminal sanctions. In addition, antisocial conduct is more than a challenge to the administration of criminal justice; it also requires the full panoply of civil sanctions, including public injunctions as well private enforcement of injunctive relief and treble damages. RICO has had a profound effect on the prosecution of organized crime, white-collar crime, and other forms of similar criminal behavior. William J. & Dorothy K. O’Neill Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School; A.B. 1957, University of Notre Dame; J.D. 1960, Notre Dame Law School. Professor Blakey was the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 1969-70 when the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-542, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) was processed, Title IX of which is the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization Act or RICO. For a general treatment of the statute from a variety of perceptive, see the collection of law review literature in G. Robert Blakey & Kevin Roddy, “Reflections on Reves v. Ernst & Young: Its Meaning an Impact on Substantive, Accessory, Aiding, Abetting and Conspiracy Liability under RICO,” 33 Amer. Crim. L. Rev. 1345, 1348 n. 3(1996).