Tax Collection in Developing Countries – New Evidence on Semi-Autonomous Revenue Agencies (SARAs)

Abstract

Over the last two decades, semi-autonomous revenue agencies (SARAs) have become a key element of public administration reform. They are supposed to improve revenue mobilisation and stabilise state–taxpayer relations. But do SARAs really outperform conventional tax administrations? This article argues that they do. Presenting the results of a panel analysis of local tax collection in Peru between 1998 and 2011, it shows that municipalities with SARAs collect more revenue than those with conventional tax administrations. The results also indicate that local revenue is more stable in municipalities with SARAs, which is good for budget policy and planning.     

Evolutionary dynamics in the voting game

Voter participation is immense but theoretically doubtful because there exists cost of voting and the probability of casting the deciding ballot is low. Game theoretic models (Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1985) confirm this paradox of voting. Individual optimization in the voting game is problematic with respect to the rationality and information requirements of traditional game theory. Therefore in this paper a non-optimizing but learning individual is considered. By individual learning the adjustment processes and equilibria of voter turnout are determined. Voters are able to learn to participate and substantial voter turnout is possible.     

Religion and inter-ethnic violence in Indonesia

Commentators have long struggled to understand state-society relations in Asia within the framework of the dominant liberal-democratic conceptualisation of civil society. This article examines the relevance of Antonio Gramsci's theory of civil society for understanding contemporary Cambodia and Vietnam, with reference to both legal and social frameworks. Such an analysis illuminates important aspects of state-society relations in Southeast Asia that tend to be overlooked by dominant liberal and Marxist perspectives. This article argues, however, that the utility of Gramsci's conception of civil society for understanding state-society relations in Cambodia and Vietnam, by retaining the notion of civil society as a realm associatively separate from the state, is limited.     

Taxing Higher Incomes: What Makes the High-Income Earners Consent to More Progressive Taxation in Latin America?

When do high-income earners get ‘on board’ with the fiscal contract and accept paying a larger share of the tax burden? Progressive taxes perform particularly poorly in developing countries. We argue that the common opposition of the affluent to more progressive taxation is not merely connected to administrative limitations to coercively enforce compliance, but also to the uncertainty that high-income earners associate with the returns to taxes. Because coercion is not an option, there is a need to convince high-income earners to ‘invest’ in the public system via taxes. Trust in institutions is decisive for the fiscal contract. Expecting that paid contributions will be used in a sensible manner, high-income earners will be more supportive of progressive income taxation. We study tax composition preferences of a cross-section of Latin American countries using public opinion data from LAPOP for 2012. Findings reveal that higher levels of trust in political institutions strongly mitigate the opposition of the affluent towards more progressive taxation.     

Oil, the Suez canal, and sterling reserves: economic factors determining British decisionmaking during the 1967 Arab-Israeli crisis

This article assesses the importance of economic factors for the development of British Middle Eastern policy during the 1967 Arab-Israeli crisis, based on newly declassified government documents. Policy shifted from threatening unilateral action against Nasser to multilateralism and neutraliry shortly before the June war. Economic considerations will be put in the context of anti-interventionist voices in the cabinet, in the defence establishment and within US policy. The article concludes that important reasons for the shift were economic, namely threats of an oil embargo, reserve withdrawals, and Suez Canal closure at a time of fiscal difficulties in Britain. In addition, an ideological shift in cabinet from 'imperial hangover' to anti-interventionism underlay the policy change.