One-or two-officer cars? A perspective from Kansas City

The relationship of police patrol-car staffing to response time is examined. The first systematic study of police patrol-car staffing, conducted in San Diego in 1977, found that two one-officer cars responded to the scene of an incident faster than one two-officer car. Given the study design, this finding was puzzling. When two one-officer cars are dispatched, at least one of the cars has farther to go, and the extra travel distance should require extra travel time. The present study replicated the previous empirical analysis with data from the Kansas City Response Time Analysis Study. Although it was expected that additional control variables would provide an explanation for the findings, the results were the same. Two one-officer cars are faster than one two-officer car. One explanation for this finding is that peer pressure among officers provides different incentives for rapid response in one- and two-officer cars. The policy implication is that the deployment of two-officer cars cannot be justified by minimized response time.     

Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence

When the state aims to prevent responsible and dangerous actors from harming its citizens, it must choose between criminal law and other preventive techniques. The state, however, appears to be caught in a Catch-22: using the criminal law raises concerns about whether early inchoate conduct is properly the target of punishment, whereas using the civil law raises concerns that the state is circumventing the procedural protections available to criminal defendants. Andrew Ashworth has levied the most serious charge against civil preventive regimes, arguing that they evade the presumption of innocence. After sketching out a substantive justification for a civil, preventive regime, I ask what Ashworth’s challenge consists in. It seems that there is broad disagreement over the meaning and requirements of the presumption of innocence. I thus survey the myriad possibilities and extract two claims that have potential bearing on preventive regimes. One claim is that of substantive priority—the criminal law comes first when assessing blame. This is the claim at the root of objections to pretrial detention based on consideration of the crime charged. The second strand of argument is one of procedural symmetry. This is the concern that with respect to citizen/state relations, certain procedures are required, including, for example, proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to the offense or defense. Having extracted these claims, I then assess their applicability with respect to the preventive regime defended. I first conclude that the criminal law must share blame and censure with other fora, and thus, the criminal law only has substantive priority when criminal proceedings have been instituted. I then survey whether procedural symmetry is required, specifically assessing whether the preventive regime I defend requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. My tentative conclusion is that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is warranted.     

Fisheries management in Jamaica,international perspectives

Abstract

This paper examines Jamaica's efforts to implement of the conservation and management provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), bearing in mind that prior to 1982 there was an existing legal framework that sought to address issues relating to fisheries management. More specifically, the paper looks at the issues related to the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks under UNCLOS and subsequent agreements negotiated under the auspices of UNCLOS. It also addresses the problems Jamaica faces with the conservation and management of Queen Conch (Strombus Gigas), in particular, the UNCLOS provisions regarding access to such resource, taking into account the limitations to such access as regulated by the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).     

Rethinking The Ends of Harm

In The Ends of Harm, Victor Tadros claims that the general justifying aim of the criminal law should be general deterrence. He also takes seriously that we cannot use people as a means, and thus he argues that we may only punish people in the name of general deterrence who have a ‘duty’ to suffer. Tadros claims that this duty arises as follows: An offender initially has a duty not to harm the victim. If the offender violates that duty, the offender still has a duty to stop the harm from occurring (so that, for example, an offender would have to jump in front of his own bullet). And if the harm does occur, then the offender has a duty to rectify that harm. This duty to rectify, argues Tadros, requires the defendant not only to compensate the victim but also to protect the victim to the extent that he would have been able to have been harmed to prevent the threat from occurring. Tadros further advances intricate arguments for why the state may therefore punish the offender to protect other potential victims to the extent of the offender’s duty to rectify. This symposium contribution seeks to explore three problems with Tadros’ analysis, ultimately arguing that Tadros’ theory fails on its own terms. First, attempts present a substantial problem for Tadros’ regime because attempts do not give rise to duties to prevent harm because there is no harm to be prevented. Tadros’ attempt to account for attempts, as completed offenses of diversions of security resources, ultimately leads to punishments that bear little resemblance to the crime attempted. Such a wildly counterintuitive result creates problems for a regime premised on general deterrence, which must be understood and respected. Second, Tadros’ regime will often exempt the rich from suffering criminal punishment. Tadros claims that duties to prevent harms from occurring (by jumping in front of bullets) are only enforceable when compensation will be inadequate. However, affluent offenders may be able to fully compensate. Moreover, since the scope of the duty to suffer will be determined by what remains of the duty after the victim is compensated, affluent offenders will be able to compensate more and thereby suffer less. Again, the actual sentences will thereby bear little resemblance to the rationale for criminalization, thus threatening the deterrent message of the law. Moreover, a system that exacerbates distributive inequalities will not achieve public respect. Third, Tadros cannot justify taking the duty that the defendant owes to the victim and forcing the victim to transfer this asset to the state. In his quest to articulate a theory that does not impermissibly use defendants, he ultimately endorses a theory that impermissibly uses their victims. He thus fails to achieve the very goal he sets for himself, which is to achieve general deterrence without impermissibly using anyone.