Social science and the Courts

Social scientists have increasingly become involved in the submission of amicus curiae or friend of the court briefs in legal cases being decided by state and federal courts. This increase has triggered considerable debate about the use of briefs to communicate relevant social science research. This article evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of various methods of summarizing social science research for the courts. It also reviews the procedures for submitting briefs developed by the American Psychology-Law Society which, in collaboration with the American Psychological Association, has submitted its first brief inMaryland v. Craig, a case recently decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.The authors wish to thank James Ogloff, Kathy Roesch, and Claudia Worrell for their comments on an earlier draft     

Border cosmopolitanism in critical peace education

This paper intends to contribute to recent developments in the theory of critical peace education. The role of cosmopolitanism in critical peace education is examined, particularly in relation to universal moral inclusion, secularism and universalism. It is then recommended that critical peace education draw from post-universalist and dialogical approaches to cosmopolitanism. Walter Mignolo’s border cosmopolitanism is suggested as a decolonising framework for critical peace education. This would entail the theory of critical peace education orienting itself towards the aim of reconsidering cosmopolitanism from the perspective of coloniality. Connections are drawn between border cosmopolitanism and Paulo Freire’s problem-posing education. The result is a vision for critical peace education to empower participants through centring personal and lived experience in critical deconstructions of cosmopolitan discourses.     

Implicit theories of criminal responsibility

Three questions relevant to insanity decisions were examined: (a) What informational cues are weighed most heavily in the attribution of criminal responsibility? (b) How do verdict forms influence these attributions? And (c) How do individuals' beliefs about insanity and responsibility influence decision making? Undergraduate subjects (n=181) responded to vignettes portraying an act by a mentally disordered defendant. Psychiatric jargon was avoided, so that attributions were not a function of diagnostic terminology. It was found that, under the traditional scheme of not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) vs. guilty, level of mental disorder (schizophrenia vs. personality disorder) was the primary determinant of insanity decisions. Also, insanity judgments were more likely to be made for acts performed without planful intentionality. Under the alternative scheme of NGRI vs. guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) vs. guilty, mental disorder still controlled NGRI verdicts; a bizarre act increased the likelihood of a GBMI over a guilty verdict; and the GBMI verdict option reduced markedly the proportion of psychotic defendants found NGRI and the proportion of personality disordered defendants found guilty. There were no significant differences between diagnostic groups in the likelihood of being found GBMI. Most subjects preferred to utilize the GBMI option as a compromise verdict even in the face of very severe mental illness. Attitudinal data revealed considerable variation in agreement with the classic moral logic of the insanity defense and accounted for a significant amount of the variance in insanity decisions. The implications for both social policy and future research are discussed.     

The believability of repressed memories

Two experiments investigated how mock jurors react to a case involving a repressed memory of child sexual assault. Subjects read a fictional civil trial (Experiment 1) or criminal trial (Experiment 2) summary involving the sexual assault of a 6-year-old female. The summary was presented in one of three conditions: (a)child condition: the alleged victim reported her memory of the assault in the same year that the assault occurred; (b)repressed condition: the alleged victim reported the assault 20 years later, after remembering it for the first time; or (c)no-repressed condition: the alleged victim reported the assault 20 years later, but the memory of the assault had been present for the 20 years. Although the testimony of the alleged victim was believed to some extent in all conditions, the alleged victim in the child condition was believed at the highest level, and this was associated with more decisions against the defendant. The results are discussed in terms of how delayed reporting of child sexual assault crimes is associated with lower believability of the alleged victim.We would like to thank Christy Kennedy, Paula Brinegar, and Elizabeth Thomas for their assistance in collecting and scoring the data, as well as Michael Nietzel, Monica Kern, Ronald Roesch, and three anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.     

An evaluation of procedures for assessing competency to stand trial

In a field experiment involving 120 defendants at Bridgewater State Hospital in Massachusetts, the authors evaluated three instruments for assessing competency to stand trial: the Competency Screening Test (CST), Competency Assessment Instrument (CAI), and Interdisciplinary Fitness Interview (IFI). The CST (a paper-and-pencil test) was administered by a research assistant and scored by trained graduate students. Lawyers, psychologists, and social workers were recruited and trained in the use of the other instruments, then assigned as individuals (CAI) or teams (IFI) to conduct interviews and assess subjects. The performance of the project interviewers was compared against two yardsticks: (1) actual decisions reached by the regular Bridgewater staff, and (2) a consensus of two nationally respected experts who reviewed the cases and formed independent competency judgments. Both the CAI and IFI performed well under these conditions, indicating that one-time interviews by well-trained persons can lead to accurate competency decisions in the majority of cases. The authors conclude that hospitalization for competency assessment is rarely necessary.     

Brief Research Report: Age Factors Affecting the Believability of Repressed Memories of Child Sexual Assault

Two experiments investigated how mock jurors react to testimony involving claims of a repressed memory in a case involving child sexual assault. Participants read a fictional civil trial summary presented in one of three conditions: (a) immediate condition—the alleged victim testified immediately after the incident; (b) repressed condition—the alleged victim reported the assault 1–39 years later, after remembering it for the first time; or (c) not-repressed condition—the alleged victim reported the assault 1–39 years later, but the memory of the assault had been present for those years. When there was any type of delayed reporting, either the age of the alleged victim at the time of the assault was constant and her age at reporting varied (Experiment 1) or the age of the alleged victim at the time of the assault varied and her age at reporting remained constant (Experiment 2). The results showed that (1) a delay in reporting an incident adversely affected believability of the alleged victim and led to fewer rulings in support of the plaintiff compared to reporting it immediately, (2) longer delays in reporting generally led to lower alleged victim believability and fewer decisions in support of the plaintiff than shorter delays, (3) the age of the alleged victim at the time of the incident was a critical variable in determining belief of the alleged victim, and (4) men generally rated believability of the alleged victim lower and ruled in favor of the plaintiff less often than women. The results are discussed in terms of the psychosocial factors affecting the perception of delayed reporting in a child sexual assault trial.