Ideas, innovations, and networks: a new policy model based on the evolution of knowledge

In this paper, we argue that a new policy model for science and technology is needed and must be evolutionary in nature. The paper proposes utilizing the idea innovation network theory as a framework for assessing sectoral innovation patterns and identifies six types, or “arenas,” of research that are linked to innovation within these networks. Following the idea innovation network theory, the paper argues that two societal trends, the fragmentation of markets and the growth of knowledge, are driving organizations toward greater functional differentiation. Successful innovation will occur when these differentiated organizations become closely linked within innovation networks that integrate the arenas of research. The paper argues that this framework has predictive power, in that it allows the identification of path-dependent blockages or gaps within idea innovation chains that prevent the emergence of effective innovation networks in different countries. Policy makers can play an important role by fostering the development of tightly coupled networks that include organizations involved in each of the types of research. The paper provides empirical support for the framework using a cross-national European study of the telecommunications and pharmaceutical industries.     

Law, Morals and Defeasibility

This paper gives a logical characterization of the interrelation between law and morals. To this purpose it first outlines a logic for defeasible reasoning with rules and principles and illustrates the operation of this logic in the field of law. Then it offers a brief argument why law and morals are interrelated. This paper ends by showing how the logic for defeasible reasoning provides tools to logically characterize some aspects of the interrelation between law and morals.     

Legal Knowledge about What?

We assume—in contrast to many "legal realists"—that law is a part of reality. Law exists because people believe in law, but law is not identical with beliefs. Law supervenes on human beliefs, preferences, actions, dispositions and artefacts. Moreover, the morally binding personal interpretation of the law supervenes on two things together: on the individual's knowledge of legal institutions and on moral obligation. The first supervenes in its turn on mutual beliefs; the second supervenes on motivations and dispositions of the individual, provided that she is morally sensitive and rational. Personal interpretation of law converts into social law, if other persons on the basis of overriding reasons do not contest it. Morally binding social law supervenes on moral motivation that is triggered by institutions that supervene on mutual beliefs.     

Rule Consistency

This paper develops the theory that a set ofrules is consistent if it is not possible that (1)the conditions of the rules in the set are allsatisfied, (2) there is no exception to either one ofthe rules, and (3) the consequences of the rules areincompatible. To this purpose the notion ofconsistency is generalised to make it cover rulesand is relativised to some background of constraints.This theory is formalised by means of Rule Logic, inwhich rules are treated as constraints on thepossible worlds in which they exist. Rule Logicitself is introduced by giving a model-theory forit. It is characterised by means of constraints onworlds that are possible according to Rule Logic.     

Law and Coherence

Abstract. This paper deals with the questions of whether the law should be coherent and what this coherence would amount to. In this connection so‐called “integrated coherentism” is introduced. According to integrated coherentism, an acceptance set is coherent if and only if it contains everything that should rationally be accepted according to what else one accepts and does not contain anything that should rationally be rejected according to what else one accepts. Such an acceptance set is ideally a theory of everything, including amongst others standards for rational aceptance. On the assumption that the law, as a social phenomenon, is what the best theory about the law says it is, the law must be coherent, because the best theory of the law is part of an integratedly coherent theory of everything. This view is compatible with Raz's view that the law stems from different sources that need not be coherent in the sense that they consistently elaborate the same underlying principles or policies. Raz's view is not a consequence of integrated coherentism, however.