Public opinion, party messages, and responsibility for the financial crisis in Britain

The political consequences of the crisis in world financial markets are only beginning to be understood. In this article, we take up one of these many repercussions by examining public beliefs of who’s to blame for a complex and unparalleled set of events. Analyses of survey data from Britain find that while most assign responsibility for the crisis to market actors, the likelihood of blaming governments, as opposed to blaming banks and investors, is greater among low sophisticates and Conservative Party identifiers. We further show how elite messages from competing political elites evolved over-time and were reflected in mass beliefs about the crisis. Results highlight the centrality of partisan cues and, in particular, of political sophistication in understanding the dynamics of responsibility attributions. Lastly, we estimate the consequences of blaming the government for the crisis for voter choice.     

Rechtssicherheit und Einzelfallgerechtigkeit im Wirtschaftsprivatrecht

Das Wirtschaftsprivatrecht ist von professionellen und planenden Akteuren beherrscht, die zur Minimierung der Transaktionskosten auf die weitestm?gliche Vorhersehbarkeit und Durchsetzbarkeit der Rechtslage angewiesen sind. Das entspricht nicht dem Blickwinkel des Richters, der nach Einzelfallgerechtigkeit in einem Rechtsstreit zwischen zwei konkreten Parteien strebt, aber auch nicht der begleitenden Wissenschaftler, die schon aus Gründen der Profilierung im wissenschaftlichen Umfeld zu innovativen und nicht selten gesetzesfernen Konzepten neigen. Der folgende Beitrag pl?diert daher für einen judicial und academic self-restraint, der sich unter Berücksichtigung der überindividuellen Auswirkungen um eine ermessensund beweisarme Rechtsatzbildung bemüht. Umso mehr sollte sich auch der Gesetzgeber des Postulats der Rechtssicherheit im Sinne der Rechtsklarheit, -stabilit?t und -durchsetzbarkeit und vor allem auch im Sinne der Vorhersehbarkeit richterlicher Entscheidungen wieder st?rker bewusst werden.     

Taking cues on multidimensional issues: the case of attitudes toward immigration

What determines popular attitudes toward immigration? Recent work emphasises the importance of education rather than economic or labour market factors. Missing from this work, however, is a consideration of elite positions. This study extends education-based accounts in two key ways: by acknowledging the multidimensional nature of the immigration issue and by incorporating cues from party elites. Cues from trusted elites inform popular attitudes on immigration. But rather than serving as a heuristic for the less sophisticated, elite cues on immigration are disproportionately employed by those more educated individuals who rely on elite positions to form opinions on multidimensional issues, like immigration, on which they are cross-pressured. Theoretical expectations are supported by evidence from cross-national analyses of party positions and public opinion and from a longitudinal examination of mass and party positions in Denmark. The results call attention to the importance of dimensionality in the formation of issue opinions.     

The impact of economic assets on party choice in Australia

While there is general agreement that economic voting matters, there is less agreement on how to measure it. This paper examines the most recent conceptualization of economic voting: the ownership of economic assets or “patrimonial” voting. Using the 2016 Australian Election Study survey, we show that property ownership and, especially, share ownership were significant influences on party choice. By contrast, ownership of an investment property or a personal superannuation fund had no significant effect on the vote. We explain this finding through the specific policies that the parties advanced in the 2016 campaign. While Labor parted ways from the Coalition by proposing radical changes to the tax treatment of investment properties but with no retrospectivity, the parties had similar positions on the tax treatment of superannuation. The findings emphasize how party policies can shape the electoral significance of asset ownership.     

Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives under Different Electoral Systems

In a seminal article, Cox (1990) suggested that electoral systems with larger district magnitudes provide incentives for parties to advocate more extreme policy positions. In this article, we put this proposition to the test. Informed by recent advances in spatial models of party competition, we introduce a design that embeds the effect of electoral rules in the utility function of voters. We then estimate the equilibrium location of parties as the weight voters attach to the expected distribution of seats and votes changes. Our model predicts that electoral rules affect large and small parties in different ways. We find centripetal effects only for parties that are favorably biased by electoral rules. By contrast, smaller parties see their vote share decline and are pushed toward more extreme equilibrium positions. Evidence from 13 parliamentary democracies supports model predictions. Along with testing the incentives provided by electoral rules, results carry implications for the strategies of vote‐maximizing parties and for the role of small parties in multiparty competition.     

Literatur

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Literatur

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Die Mitunternehmer-GesBR nach geltendem und künftigem Recht

Im ABGB-Jubil?umsjahr wird ua über eine Reform des GesBR-Rechts nachgedacht, das eine Erneuerung auch in der Tat bitter n?tig hat. Die folgenden überlegungen dienen einer vorbereitenden Bestandsaufnahme in Bezug auf solche (Au?en-)Gesellschaften bürgerlichen Rechts, die auf den Betrieb eines Unternehmens gerichtet sind. Denn diese Sonderform der Mitunternehmer-GesBR, deren Vertretung durch das HaR?G neu geregelt wurde (§ 178 UGB), ist bislang in der Literatur weit weniger diskutiert worden als die "Stammform" der (Zivil-)GesBR.