Is Dharmak��rti Grabbing the Rabbit by the Horns? A Reassessment of the Scope of Prameya in Dharmak��rtian Epistemology

This paper attempts to make sense of Dharmak??rti??s conflicting statements regarding the object of valid cognition (prameya) in various parts of his works, considering in particular the claims that (i) there are two kinds of prameyas (particulars and universals), (ii) the particular alone is prameya, and (iii) what is non-existent also qualifies as prameya. It inquires into the relationship between validity (pr??m???ya), reliability (avisa?v??da) and causal efficacy (arthakriy??) and suggests that the discussion on non-existent prameyas in Pram???avini?caya 3 provides an alternative to an overall ??practicalist?? reading of Dharmak??rti, practicalist in the sense that pram???as are primarily oriented toward human aims and hence bear on objects capable of fulfilling them through their causal capacities. Considering the views of Dharmak??rti??s interpreters, it shows how Dharmottara (8th c.), rejecting such an alternative, strives to reconcile claim (iii) with a practicalist interpretation, while Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (12th c.) generalizes the application of a criterion of validity superseding an arthakriy??-oriented framework by bringing to the fore the notion of ??non-opposition?? (ab??dhana) introduced by Dharmak??rti with regard to non-existent prameyas and suprasensorial objects.     

Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge on Argumentation by Consequence (thal ʼgyur): The Nature, Function, and Form of Consequence Statements

This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ?gyur, Skt. prasa?ga) based on his exposition of the topic in the fifth chapter of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and on a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramānavini?caya. It aims at circumscribing primarily the nature and function of consequences (thal ?gyur/thal ba) for this author—in particular the distinction between “proving consequences” and “refuting consequences”—and the form prescribed for their enunciation in the context of debate. In addition to pointing out differences with the systems adopted by his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, the paper also discusses some of the similarities and differences between Phya pa’s understanding of argumentation by consequence and the notion of reductio ad absurdum in Western logic.     

Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Classification of Arguments by Consequence Based on the Type of the Logical Reason: Editorial Conundrum and Mathematics for Commentators

This paper examines a passage of the eleventh chapter of the Rigs gter of Sa skya Pa??ita (1182–1251) on the division of arguments by consequence (thal ?gyur) of the form “Because S is P, it follows that it is Q” with respect to the type of relation between P and Q. This passage appears in quite different versions in several available recensions of the Rigs gter, all of which are problematic to some extent. The different interpretations of the commentators can be shown to derive from their reliance on different versions of the text, which they strove to make sense of through two distinct strategies. Following up on the examination of a division of arguments by consequence along the same line in the works of Sa skya Pa??ita’s Tibetan predecessors, in particular Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge (ca. 1150–1210) (see Hugon, in J Indian Philos 44(5):883–938, 2016b), I evaluate the diverging versions of the Rigs gter against a coherent logical scenario founded on Sa skya Pa??ita’s discussion pertaining to the types of logical reasons in inference in the tenth chapter of his work and comparison with the classification by Phya pa. I offer a hypothesis regarding the genesis of the problematic versions of the passage on the classification of consequences in the Rigs gter based on the comparison with the classification found in mTshur ston’s epistemological work. I propose that the composition of this portion of the Rigs gter might have involved a textual reuse of mTshur ston’s classification, even though mTshur ston and Sa skya Pa??ita disagree on background issues. This very disagreement imposed changes to the reused text that led to problematic readings.     

Breaking the Circle. Dharmakīrti’s Response to the Charge of Circularity Against the Apoha Theory and its Tibetan Adaptation

This paper examines the Buddhist’s answer to one of the most famous (and more intuitive) objections against the semantic theory of “exclusion” (apoha), namely, the charge of circularity. If the understanding of X is not reached positively, but X is understood via the exclusion of non-X, the Buddhist nominalist is facing a problem of circularity, for the understanding of X would depend on that of non-X, which, in turn, depends on that of X. I distinguish in this paper two strategies aiming at “breaking the circle”: (i) conceding the precedence of a positive understanding of X, from which a negative understanding (i.e., the understanding of “non-X”) is derived by contrast, and (ii) denying any precedence by proposing a simultaneous understanding of both X and non-X. I consider how these two options are articulated respectively by Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika cum Svavṛtti and by one of his Tibetan interpreters, Sa skya Paṇḍita, and examine the requirements for their workability. I suggest that Sa skya Paṇḍita’s motivation to opt for an alternative solution has to do with his criticism of notions shared by his Tibetan predecessors, an outline of which is given in Appendix 1. In Appendix 2, I present the surprising use of the charge of circularity by an early Tibetan logician against his coreligionists.