Public support for pro-choice abortion policies in the nation and states: changes and stability after the Roe and Doe decisions

In 1973 the United States Supreme Court ruled that abortion could be had practically on request during the first 3 months of pregnancy. This article discusses whether the decision led to more public support for that position, and where in the U.S. the increase in support has been most drastic. The most recent public opinion polls indicate about 60% public support legalized abortion, while it was only 45% before 1973. Support has also increased even if pregnancy is not judged to be detrimental to the mother's health, or if it is not the result of rape and/or incest, but even if it is simply requested for economic or purely personal reasons. People under 30, with college education, men and Protestants, seem to be the staunchest supporters of abortion on demand. There has also been an increase in the number of Catholics supporting abortion. Support for abortion increased in most states between 1969-1973, particularly in the West and in the Northwest. The fight to deny federal funds for abortion is still raging in Congress; some studies indicate that the religion of the legislators is the most powerful predictor of voting on abortion, and that the decision is a very personal one, and not easily altered by the lobbying of groups on either side.     

Is there a relationship between election outcomes and perceptions of personal economic well-being? A test using post-election economic expectations

Do individuals believe that an election victory by their favored candidate will improve their personal economic well-being? Previous work has either adopted an approach that is not well suited to determining this relationship, or ignored this question to focus on perceptions of macroeconomic conditions. In this paper we adopt a new approach that allows us to determine the relationship individuals perceive between elections and personal economic welfare, examining the relationship between vote choice, the election outcome, and post-election expectations for personal economic well-being. We find that economic individualism plays an important role in shaping the relationship individuals perceive between election outcomes and their personal economic well-being. Individuals who reject economic individualism do perceive a relationship, with those viewing an election outcome as favorable more optimistic in their expectations for personal economic well-being than those who view the election outcome as unfavorable. Conversely, election outcomes do not influence the expectations of economic individualists.     

How people organise cultural attitudes: cultural belief systems and the populist radical right

Political scientists generally agree that all individuals structure their cultural attitudes in the same unidimensional fashion. However, various populist radical right parties remarkably combine moral progressiveness with conservatism regarding immigration-related issues. This suggests that the structuring of cultural attitudes among the electorate may also be more complex than typically assumed. Applying Correlational Class Analysis to representative survey data, the study uncovers three cultural belief systems. For individuals adhering to an integrated one, all cultural attitudes are interdependent, as typically assumed. However, two alternative belief systems are also uncovered: intermediate and partitioned. In the latter, positions on one cultural attitude (e.g. ethnocentrism) are barely related to positions on others (e.g. rejecting Islam or opposing homosexuality). The existence of multiple cultural belief systems challenges the widely held assumption that all people organise their cultural attitudes similarly. Both political party agendas and individuals’ education level and religion appear key to understanding variation in belief systems.     

Political Fact-Checking on Twitter: When Do Corrections Have an Effect?

Research suggests that fact checking corrections have only a limited impact on the spread of false rumors. However, research has not considered that fact-checking may be socially contingent, meaning there are social contexts in which truth may be more or less preferred. In particular, we argue that strong social connections between fact-checkers and rumor spreaders encourage the latter to prefer sharing accurate information, making them more likely to accept corrections. We test this argument on real corrections made on Twitter between Janurary 2012 and April, 2014. As hypothesized, we find that individuals who follow and are followed by the people who correct them are significantly more likely to accept the correction than individuals confronted by strangers. We then replicate our findings on new data drawn from November 2015 to February, 2016. These findings suggest that the underlying social structure is an important factor in the correction of misinformation.     

Transforming Gender Relations through the Market: Smallholder Milk Market Participation and Women`s Intra-household Bargaining Power in Ethiopia

We study the relationship between smallholder milk market participation and women`s intra-household bargaining position in Ethiopia, using a quasi-experiment and propensity score matching. In market participant households, milk income is higher and its control has shifted from women to men. Our data also indicate that men transfer this income partly to their wives. Qualitative findings indicate that men see this as recognition for their wife’s household maintenance responsibility. Women argue however that transferring income is also men`s tactic for reducing intra-household conflict. Overall, dependency between husbands and wives seems higher and a woman’s bargaining position stronger in participant households.