Crossing the Ideological Divide? Egypt's Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood after the Arab Spring

An important strand in the literature has stressed the analytical distinction between the Muslim Brotherhood's brand of Islamism and the Salafist movement. This article examines the shifts that have occurred within these two movements in Egypt since the Arab Spring. It specifically asks whether approximations between them in terms of strategies of actions have been paralleled by ideological approximations. The article argues that both movements have seen increased diversification which has—especially at the fringes—involved a reshaping of identities and ideological approximations that may facilitate cooperation between segments of these movements in the future.     

Domestic Judicial Institutions and Human Rights Treaty Violation

Democratic and autocratic states routinely violate their international agreements protecting human rights. Scholars typically link ratification and compliance behavior theoretically but test their models separately; however, if the behaviors are jointly determined then we should treat them that way empirically. We consider how domestic judiciaries influence the joint choice to ratify and comply with international human rights regimes. Using data on the ratification status of states under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), states' torture practices, and a series of measures of judicial effectiveness, we examine whether legal institutions are likely to constrain state behavior and by implication raise the costs of ratification.     

A common transnational agenda? Communication network and discourse of political-Salafists on Twitter

Employing social network analysis, this article investigates the transnational communication network and discourse of political-Salafists on social media. It examines whether political-Salafists across the MENA region have a common sociopolitical and geopolitical agenda, and whether – given the recent shift of some political-Salafists towards violence – their discourse and communication network can still be distinguished from that of the jihadists. The analysis finds that political-Salafists do not share a common agenda but that their discourse and communication network display three transnational gravity centres: a revisionist, a status quo-oriented and an ostracized pro-Sisi gravity centre. Only the revisionist gravity centre advocates violence. Its discourse, however, remains clearly set apart from that of the jihadists.     

Poland’s stance on CAI: no need for haste

Asia Europe Journal - Poland was among vocal critics of the acceleration and finalization of CAI talks by the end of 2020. Among the reasons were doubts about the timing and political circumstances...