Market alternative to state activism in restoring the capitalist economy

The theory of economic transition is concerned less with the end product of building a capitalist economy than with intermediate solutions and the appropriate pace of institutional change. This article advances theoretical arguments on the advantages of a self-grown, evolutionary restoration of the capitalist economy in Eastern Europe or any country abandoning the socialist experiment. The article develops the point that of the two basic methods of setting up an economic order—the state or a market-type mechanism—only the latter can assure the emergence of a genuine, complete market. Further, it suggests that markets with self-interested individual actors at the center are not only superior to states in the allocation of scarce resources, be they economic or political, but are also the best vehicle for institution building.     

Some regularities in the shape of broken glass

Angles and curvatures of edges of glass fragments were measured. Some statistical regularities have been observed. This may be important for the assessment of the value of identification.     

Voters’ perceptions of government performance and attributions of responsibility: Electoral control in Poland

We test the claim that elections function as a mechanism of accountability in the case of Poland, a new democracy with a fluid party system. We ask whether individuals’ vote intentions are based on assessments of governing parties’ performance. Taking into consideration attributions of responsibility for such performance, accountability exists if assessments of poor performance decrease the probability of voting for a ruling party. We use two criteria of performance: perceived change in unemployment rate and level of corruption between two consecutive elections. Using data from the Polish POLPAN panel survey, our results confirm the existence of a heterogeneous sanctioning model.