COMPETITION POLICY WITH OPTIMALLY DIFFERENTIATED RULES INSTEAD OF "PER SE RULES VS RULE OF REASON"

Both in U.S. antitrust and EU competition policy, a developmentto a broader application of rule of reason instead of per serules can be observed. In the European discussion the attemptto base competition policy on a "more economic approach" ismainly viewed as improving the economic analysis in the assessmentof specific cases. In this paper it is shown from a generallaw and economics perspective that the application of rulesinstead of focussing on case-by-case analyses can have manyadvantages (lower regulation costs, rent-seeking, and knowledgeproblems), although an additional differentiation of rules througha deeper assessment can also have advantages in regard to thereduction of decision errors of type I and II. After introducingthe notion of a continuum of more or less differentiated rules,we show—based upon law and economics literature upon theoptimal complexity of rules—in a simple model that a competitionrule is optimally differentiated if the marginal reduction ofthe sum of error costs (as the marginal benefit of differentiation)equals the marginal costs of differentiation. This model alsoallows for a more detailed analysis of the most important determinantsof the optimal degree of rule-differentiation. From this lawand economics perspective, competition policy should consistmainly of (more or less differentiated) rules and should onlyrarely rely on case-by-case analysis. Therefore the main taskof a "more economic approach" is to use economics for the formulationof appropriate competition rules.     

An optional European contract law code: Advantages and disadvantages

Should the EU introduce an Optional European Contract Law Code and what should it look like? By applying economic theories of federalism and regulatory competition (legal federalism), it is shown why an Optional Code would be a very suitable legal instrument within a two-level European System of Contract Laws. By allowing private parties’ choice of law to a certain extent, it can combine the most important advantages of centralisation and decentralisation of competences for legal rules. Through differentiated analyses of three kinds of contract law rules (mandatory substantive rules, mandatory information rules and facilitative law), important conclusions can be reached: which kinds of contract law rules are most suitable to be applied on an optional basis (e.g. facilitative law) and which might be less so (e.g. a core of information regulations). Furthermore a number of additional general conclusions about the design and scope of an Optional EU Code and some conclusions in regard to sales law are derived.     

European Corporate Laws, Regulatory Competition and Path Dependence

Beyond the well-known discussion in regard to the Cassis de Dijon of the European Court of Justice, implying the mutual recognition of national product regulations, the topic of mutual recognition and regulatory competition has emerged again in the realm of European corporate laws (“Centros” of the ECJ in 1999). Can effective competition among European corporate laws be expected? In the US a broad discussion has developed whether the existing competition process among US corporate laws leads to permanent legal improvements by legal innovations or to a race to the bottom. Beyond this discussion a new point has been raised recently: the possibility and importance of path dependence as a potential problem for the efficacy of competition among corporate laws (lock-ins). For the analysis of this problem we apply the concept of technological paradigms and trajectories to legal rules in corporate law and introduce “legal paradigms,” which direct the search for better legal solutions in certain directions and might be stabilized by certain factors (esp. complementarities to other legal rules) leading to considerable path dependence effects. Our results show that path dependence might play a crucial role for competition among European corporate laws, even if the principle of mutual recognition would be introduced to corporate laws in the EU, implying that competition among European corporate laws might be difficult and sluggish. Consequently the question arises whether additional meta-rules should be established that might mitigate the problem of path dependence and lock-ins in regulatory competition in corporate law.     

The German Facebook case: the law and economics of the relationship between competition and data protection law

European Journal of Law and Economics - Can competition law consider effects on privacy, or should privacy concerns of data-collecting behaviour only be dealt with by data protection law? In this...