BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO: ROMANTIC DISSOLUTION,OFFENDING, AND SUBSTANCE USE DURING THE TRANSITION TO ADULTHOOD*

Recent studies have directed attention to the nature of romantic involvement and its implications for offending over the life course. However, this body of research has overlooked a defining aspect of nonmarital romantic relationships: Most come to an end. By drawing on insights from general strain theory, the age‐graded theory of informal social control, and research on delinquent peer exposure, we explore the impact of romantic dissolution on offending and substance use during late adolescence and emerging adulthood. Using data from the 1997 cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we arrive at three general conclusions: 1) Experiencing a breakup is directly related to a range of antisocial outcomes; 2) the effect of a breakup is dependent on post‐breakup relationship transitions; and 3) a breakup is associated with increases in offending and substance use among males and in substance use among females. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for the future of research on romantic involvement and crime over the life course.     

Redistributing Campaign Funds by U.S. House Members: The Spiraling Costs of the Permanent Campaign

In this article, we document and analyze the increase in the redistribution of campaign funds by U.S. House members during the 1990 through 2000 election cycles. By examining the contribution activity of members' leadership PACs and principal campaign committees, we show that House incumbents substantially increased their contributions to other House candidates and to the congressional campaign committees. The amount of money a member redistributes is a function of that member's institutional position: the greater the position's level of responsibility to the party caucus, the more campaign money the member redistributes, particularly as competition for majority control increases. Also, a member's capacity to raise surplus campaign funds, his or her support for the party's policy positions, and the level of competition for partisan control of the institution all affect the amount the member redistributes.