Explaining the Reform of Banking Supervision in Europe: An Integrative Approach

National frameworks for banking and, more generally, financial supervision in various European countries have undergone significant changes in the last decade or so. What explains these supervisory reforms? This work addresses this question by examining the recent reforms in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, engaging in a structured, focused comparison, mainly using process tracing and adopting an analytical framework articulated across three levels of analysis. It is argued that while international and EU factors acted as antecedent variables, establishing the background for the reforms, they were mediated by national factors—to be precise, by two independent variables—that account for distinctive modes and outcomes of reforms. In addition, the institutional strength of the central bank—the intervening variable—can make a difference to the process of reform by either inhibiting or catalyzing change.     

The politics of financial services regulation and supervision reform in the European Union

Abstract.  The regulation and supervision of financial services in the European Union (EU) has undergone major reform between 1999 and 2004. This policy evolution is theoretically interesting, raising the question of which conceptual approaches better explain it, and it is also empirically relevant because it is an area of intense EU activity. This article provides a theoretically informed and empirically grounded explanation of the policy reform by evaluating the analytical leverage of three integration theories, mainly by relying on two methods – process tracing and congruence procedure – employing a variety of primary and secondary sources. It is argued that sequencing different theoretical approaches – interdependence , supranational governance and liberal intergovernmentalism – explains the various stages of the policy-making process – namely, background-setting, agenda-setting and decision making, as well as the main features of the outcome.     

Civil Servants, Economic Ideas, and Economic Policies: Lessons from Italy

Building on theoretically oriented and empirically grounded research on two key macroeconomic institutions in Italy, this article explains how and why civil servants can engineer major policy changes, making a difference in a country's trajectory. Italy provides a challenging testing ground for this kind of analysis, as it is generally portrayed as a highly politicized system in which political parties and politicians fully control public policies. Three general lessons can be learned, the first being that the role of civil servants in changing modes of economic governance depends on the resources that they master in the system in which they operate. "Intangible assets" are of primary importance in complex and perceived technical policies, such as monetary and exchange rate policy, which have high potential for "technocratic capture." Second, in these policies, certain intangible assets, such as specific bodies of economic knowledge or policy paradigms, have a considerable impact on policy making. Third, besides interactions in international fora, the professional training of civil servants is a mainstream way through which economic policy beliefs circulate and gain currency, laying the foundations for policy shifts. By highlighting the importance of the intangible assets of macroeconomic institutions, this research makes an unorthodox contribution to the primarily economic literature on central bank independence.