European associations in law and economics foreword

European Journal of Law and Economics -     

How the court made a federation of the EU

We analyze the European institutional integration that took place in the 1950s and 1960s as a two-stage process. Firstly, an explicitly political project aims at establishing a European political community. The project is abandoned in the mid-1950s and political integration stops. At that time, the institutions of the Union take the form of a confederation. In a second stage, because of the failure of the European political community, a legal process of integration driven by the European Court of Justice takes place. This second stage of unification is more centralizing and in effect leads to a federalization of the European institutional structure. The transformation of the political structure of the European Union thus appears to result from the actions and decisions of a legal entity, the European Court of Justice.      

Displacing your Principal. Two Historical Case Studies of Some Interest for the Constitutional Future of Europe

The framework of public decisions, and particularly the provision of law, is seen here as an agency contract. What distinguishes this contract is the nature of the right delegated to the agent: The capacity to make law gives the opportunity to take advantage of the incompleteness of the constitutional contract. The agency relationship may be loosened or even reversed. This article tries to draw some lessons from the English and American history in that matter and applies them to the making of the future European State.     

Seeking rents through class actions and legislative lobbying: a comparison

This article analyzes class actions as a technology that groups may use in their rent-seeking activity, in addition to other rent-seeking methods such as legislative investment within the political market, when they seek to achieve favorable decisions from decision-makers—courts and legislators. It claims that groups may make their choice between various rent-seeking technologies according to their sensitivity to the problem of free riding. Therefore, it analyzes the effect of the legal instruments that facilitate class action lawsuits and collective litigation in most countries upon the rent-seeking strategies of groups, as compared to rent-seeking through legislation.     

The Making of the French Civil Code: An Economic Interpretation

The code Napoleon has been one of the first (on such a scale), the most important and the most pervasive processes of codification that ever took place. The purpose of our paper is to provide an economic analysis of the making of this codification. We compare customary codification and contractual codification: while the former amounts to the crystallisation of socially accepted practices, the latter consists in a creation of rules through a writing process. These theoretical differences are less clear-cut when history mixes practices and reasoned arguments. We then show that the making of the code Napoleon reflects it since it borrows from the social contract and the spontaneous order traditions.     

COVID 19: how coercive were the coercive measures taken to fight the pandemic

European Journal of Law and Economics - Preventive detention legislation allows for the ongoing detention of an offender’s sentence. We explore the effects of pretrial detention on case...     

The judge,the academic and the public intellectual: the totemic scholarship of Richard A. Posner

Richard A. Posner plays a totemic role within law and economics, and not only. His scholarship is so wide to the point that it is quite impossible to face any topic without finding a seminal contribution by him. This introduction presents a special issue devoted to Posner’s scientific and academic work.     

Judicial conformity versus dissidence: an economic analysis of judicial precedent

The individual decision made by a judge does not only reflect his personal preferences about a case but also the expected response of the judicial community to the decision. We propose an analysis of judicial attitudes towards precedent based on the adoption externalities associated with legal rules. The situation is modelled as a coordination problem within a sequential game of two periods in which judges play a bandwagon strategy.