Forensic chemical testing of cadaveric material for acetonitrile

Gas chromatographic conditions for qualitative and quantitative evaluation of acetonitrile in biological material were determined, including those for reactive gas chromatography. Absolute and relative time of acetonitrile and concomitant substances retention in three columns of different polarity was determined. Study of the time of acetonitrile retention in biological material showed that acetonitrile concentration in the blood virtually did not change in cadaveric material stored in a hermetically closed flask for 2 weeks at 20 +/- 3 degrees C, while its concentration in the stomach decreased by 10-15%. Distribution of acetonitrile in human viscera in lethal poisoning was studied; the agent was evenly distributed in the gastric wall, intestine, liver, and kidney, while its concentrations in the lung and brain were 2-3 times higher. Forensic chemical expert analyses of the blood, urine, and viscera from corpses of humans dead from lethal acetonitrile poisoning showed that lethal concentration in the blood was 28.3-57.0 mg and in the urine 23.2-40.6 mg/100 ml.     

Government survival in semi‐presidential regimes

As semi‐presidentialism has become increasingly common in European democracies, so have the debates about the consequences of several of its political and institutional features. In particular, in those regimes, cohabitation between presidents and cabinets of different parties and cabinet dismissal powers on the part of presidents are thought to be a source of inter‐branch conflict and government instability. However, so far, most empirical work on government survival has failed to confirm any of these expectations. This article addresses this disjuncture between theory and empirical results by making a twofold contribution. First, it takes into account the internal diversity within semi‐presidentialism, modeling the implications for government survival of different configurations between presidential powers’ of cabinet dismissal, parliament dissolution and cohabitation in European semi‐presidential systems. Second, it reconsiders traditional government survival using the competing risks framework by adding a distinction between two different types of non‐electoral replacement: those where replacements imply a change in the party of the prime minister and those where they do not. Once such an approach is adopted, that presidential powers of parliamentary dissolution and cabinet dismissal indeed emerge as highly relevant for explaining government survival in these regimes.