Coercive capacity,land reform and political order in Afghanistan

This article compares four historical periods in Afghanistan to better understand whether land reform in the post-2001 context will improve prospects for political order. Its central finding is that political order can be established without land reform provided that the state is able to establish and maintain coercive capacity. However, the cost of establishing political order mainly through coercion is very low levels of economic development. We also find that when land reform was implemented in periods of weak or declining coercive capacity, political disorder resulted from grievances unrelated to land issues. In addition, land reforms implemented in the context of highly centralized political institutions increased property insecurity. This suggests the importance of investing in coercive capacity alongside land reform in the current context but also that establishing inclusive political institutions prior to land reform will increase its chances of success.     

Wealth-destroying states

Public Choice - According to the contract theory of the state, individuals give up their freedom to a specialist in violence who then provides public goods, such as private property rights and...     

Anarchy,self-governance,and legal titling

Scholars and policymakers prescribe legal titling to improve prospects for economic development and political order. However, a public choice literature exists that has long recognized that self-governance often works well and that the state may not be able to improve upon local economic institutions at reasonable cost. Although the implication that legal titling should proceed with caution is seemingly straightforward, the literature on legal titling does not take anarchy seriously as a policy option. In addition, there is a public choice literature that presumes the state is the most important source of property rights. This essay fills this gap in the property rights literature by applying the concept of “efficient anarchy” to legal titling in Afghanistan. Original fieldwork evidence from rural Afghanistan suggests that anarchy of land governance is a better option than legal titling. The essay concludes by opening up the black box of state building by explaining why it often makes sense to sequence improvements in political capacity and political constraints prior to investing in legal titling.     

Does the sequence of land reform and political reform matter? Evidence from state-building in Afghanistan

Property insecurity is associated with terrorism, insurgency and economic underdevelopment. For this reason, land reform is often implemented alongside political reform in post-conflict settings. In contrast, this article argues that political reform should be sequenced prior to land reform during state-building. Evidence from Afghanistan shows how land redistribution, legal titling, decentralisation of state-owned land and provision of legal services to resolve land disputes are unlikely to alleviate political violence or facilitate economic development without establishing or substantially improving political capacity, political constraints and inclusive political institutions at the local level. These findings suggest the importance of sequence in the process of land reform and political reform. More generally, political reform is a prerequisite for land reform to reduce violence and improve development prospects in post-conflict settings.     

Gaming the state: consequences of contracting out state building in Afghanistan

The operation of a vibrant illicit economy and government corruption are widely acknowledged as obstacles to the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, massive influxes of money tied to the international efforts have led to ‘legal’ corruption that similarly obstructs state consolidation and peace. This paper considers the various ways in which Afghan entrepreneurs have learned to ‘game the state’ by taking advantage of donor and especially US procurement systems since 2001. The conceptual framework and evidence suggests that designing ways to limit corruption arising from the state-building process is key to improving the long-run prospects for post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan and similar states where rapid and steep increases in foreign aid and associated contracts create fertile ground for malfeasance.     

Pandemics,economic freedom,and institutional trade-offs

European Journal of Law and Economics - We argue that institutions are bundles that involve trade-offs in the government’s ability to provide public goods that affect public health. We...