Regulatory capabilities: A normative framework for assessing the distributional effects of regulation

This paper develops the normative concept of “regulatory capabilities.” It asserts that nobody – individuals, groups, or entities – should be subjected to a regulatory regime without some freedom to determine its nature. Self‐determination in this context means the ability to accept or reject a regulatory regime imposed by others or to develop viable alternative approaches. We use the term “regulatory capabilities” to capture the importance of enabling conditions for regulatory self‐determination. This is particularly important in the transnational context where private, hybrid public–private, and public actors compete for influence, shape domestic regulation, and, in doing so, limit the scope for democratic self‐governance. In short, this paper seeks to contribute to the general debate on the normative foundations of and the requisite conditions for transnational regulation and governance.     

Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from China

Jump-starting stock markets in transition economies has proveddifficult. These countries lack effective legal governance structuresand face severe information problems. Yet not all financialmarkets failed because of adverse conditions. Using China’sinitial stock market development as a case study, this articlesuggests that administrative governance can substitute for formallegal governance. At the core of this governance structure wasthe quota system. It created incentives for regional competitionand decentralized information collection at the IPO stage. Itwas also used to punish regions and responsible officials whencompanies from their regions failed, as evidenced herein.