Ratnākaraśānti’s Theory of Cognition with False Mental Images (*alīkākāravāda) and the Neither-One-Nor-Many Argument

The paper aims to clarify Ratnākara?ānti?s epistemological theory that mental images in a cognition are false (*alīkākāravāda) in comparison with ?āntarak?ita?s criticism of the Yogācāra position. Although Ratnākara?ānti frequently uses the neither-one-nor-many argument for explaining his Yogācāra position, the argument, unlike ?āntarak?ita?s original one, does not function for refuting the existence of awareness itself as the basis of mental images. This point is examined in the first two sections of this paper by analyzing Ratnākara?ānti?s proof of the selflessness of entities (dharmanairātmya) and his application of the neither-one-nor-many argument for demonstrating the falsehood of mental images. On the other hand, the last section investigates into his defense of the alīkākāravāda against ?āntarak?ita?s severe criticism of it. Here, too, we can find his tactical usage of the neither-one-nor-many argument, or more precisely, one of its variants: the neither-identical-nor-different argument. Through the above procedure, we can see how Yogācāra philosophy survived in the late period of Indian Buddhism by blending the Madhyamaka opponent?s argument with its own thought.     

On Self-Awareness in the Sautrāntika Epistemology

This paper aims to examine the role of self-awareness (svasa?vedana) for the Sautrāntika epistemological tenet known as the doctrine that cognition has a form (sākārajñānavāda). According to this theory, we perceive external objects indirectly through the mental forms that these objects throw into our minds, and this cognitive act is interpreted as self-awareness. However, if one were to interpret the cognitive act such that the subjective mental form (grāhakākāra/svābhāsa) grasps the objective mental form, the position of the subjective mental form becomes problematic—it becomes superfluous, as can be demonstrated with reference to Dignāga’s explanation of the Sautrāntika’s pramā?a-pramā?aphala argument. As a result, self-awareness itself becomes precarious. In connection with this problem, an argument on the relationship between self-awareness and the yogic perception of other minds given by Dharmakīrti leads us to discover that self-awareness is important for establishing subjectivity, in order to avoid another person’s access to one’s own mental states. Through examining Pramā?avārttika 3.448–459, this paper tries to find a way to interpret the svābhāsa-factor without relating to its object-factor (grāhyākāra), and to shed new light on the problem of subjectivity in the Sautrāntika epistemology.     

Empathy and Fairness: Psychological Mechanisms for Eliciting and Maintaining Prosociality and Cooperation in Primates

In the past, prosociality has been considered a hallmark of humans; however, recently, accumulating data have empirically revealed that non-human animals also show prosocial behavior. In situations in which animals cannot predict return benefits, prosocial behavior is probably driven by other-regarding motivation. A sense of fairness and empathy continue to draw attention as the most plausible candidates for the psychological mechanisms underlying such prosocial behavior. In this article, we first introduce comparative studies on prosocial behavior in non-human primates and discuss similarities and differences between humans and non-human primates. Then, we discuss the role of a sense of fairness and empathy. In this paper, we hypothesize that empathy may promote prosocial behavior, whereas a sense of fairness may play a role as a stabilizer, but not as a promoter of prosocial behavior in non-human animals. We further hypothesize that prosocial behavior motivated by sympathetic concerns can survive only with a sense of fairness, the inhibitory system for unnecessarily excessive expression of prosocial behavior. Without a sense of fairness, empathic animals might be exploited by free-riders, which might lead to the extinction of cooperation. Therefore, the interplay of a sense of fairness and empathy are both important to maintaining prosocial behavior and cooperation. This hypothesis seems to be supported by comparative studies with non-human primates and also by neural studies with humans.