Concealed takings: Capture and rent-seeking in the Indian Sugar Industry

This paper has attempted to test the applicability of the Public Choice approach in explaining regulation in the Indian Sugar Industry over the 1967–82 period. A test for discriminating between Public Interest and Capture theories of regulation was developed and implemented in the context of the historical pattern of controls found in the Indian Sugar Industry. The results point toward the rejection of the Public Interest theory of regulation and are consistent with the hypothesis of the capture of regulation by the regulated industry. The importance of the various interest groups and their influence on the regulation actually enacted was also revealed by the analysis.The findings are consistent with the existence of substantial rent-seeking and other D.U.P. activity (Bhagwati, 1982) in the Indian sugar sector during the post-independence period. They point toward the substantial welfare losses suffered by consumers and the economy at large as a result of the control regime that has existed in the Indian sugar sector. Removal of such controls will more than likely increase the availability of sugar at lower prices thus increasing the welfare of consumers while reducing the extent of corruption and other rent-seeking activity that the controls have generated.     

Can disincentives bring accountability in governance? Experiences of Right to Public Services Guarantee Act in Madhya Pradesh State of India

Many Indian states have enacted Right to Public Services Guarantee Act that promises the delivery of public services to citizens in time‐bound fashion, failing to which, responsible government officials face financial penalty. Therefore, effective service delivery, an indicator of good and responsive governance, is being attempted to be achieved through a “system of disincentive.” The paper tries to analyze if the system of disincentive is effective in ensuring administrative accountability. The paper is based on primary and secondary data. The primary data were collected as part of an action research carried out in 2012, which was supplemented with secondary data collected for different studies during 2015 and 2016. The paper uses a governance accountability framework to analyze implementation of the Act. The study finds that although success rate of implementation of the Act is quite high, the Act presents a narrow idea of accountability. There are no accountability norms for higher officials and elected leaders who head the public service departments. The study also finds that necessary accountability structures have not been developed and there is a dearth of enabling environment that makes accountability structures effective. The study also finds that, despite the provisions for financial penalty, responsible officials find ways to escape. The study exposes weak points in the implementation of the Act, which can be strengthened to achieve desired outcomes. The study can be an important source for course corrections in the states/countries where right to public service delivery is in effect.     

Aspects of Inclusion and Peoples’ Empowerment Related to National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, launched in the year 2006, is dubbed as one of the major flagship strategies of the Government of India, in coherence with the objective of removing poverty and unemployment. While scope of employment in rural asset creation protects environment, the earning opportunities address the issue of financial and social inclusion. Principal Component Analysis has been applied to calculate Financial, Social, Environmental, and finally Overall Inclusion Index as well as Empowerment Index. The results reveal significant association between Overall Inclusion and Empowerment index. Using multiple regression, Overall Inclusion is explained by certain significant variables.     

Women's Job Participation in and Efficiency of NREGA Program—Case Study of a Poor District in India

NREGA program in India offers a lucrative opportunity for the rural women to participate in job market, earn income, and have control over life events. However women's decision for participation as well as share in NREGA jobs are influenced by various socio-economic factors like education, caste, religion, alternative income, health-related achievements, and fund availability. Variation in some of these variables is often beyond their control. In this context logit regression and DEA efficiency analysis is done to analyses the issue of women's participation and share of employment days in the context a poor region in India.     

Do Participatory Learning and Action Women’s Groups Alone or Combined with Cash or Food Transfers Expand Women’s Agency in Rural Nepal?

Participatory learning and action women’s groups (PLA) have proven effective in reducing neonatal mortality in rural, high-mortality settings, but their impacts on women’s agency in the household remain unknown. Cash transfer programmes have also long targeted female beneficiaries in the belief that this empowers women. Drawing on data from 1309 pregnant women in a four-arm cluster-randomised controlled trial in Nepal, we found little evidence for an impact of PLA alone or combined with unconditional food or cash transfers on women’s agency in the household. Caution is advised before assuming PLA women’s groups alone or with resource transfers necessarily empower women.     

More Inequality,More Killings: The Maoist Insurgency in Nepal

The hypothesis of inequality as the source of violent conflict is investigated empirically in the context of killings by Nepalese Maoists in their People's War against their government during 1996–2003. The dependent variable is the total number of people killed during that period by Maoist rebels in each of 3,857 villages. Inequality is measured by the Gini, the Esteban‐Ray polarization index, and four other between‐groups indexes. Using models with district fixed effects, and instrumenting for endogeneity of the inequality measures, we find strong evidence that greater inequality escalated killings by Maoists. Poverty did not necessarily increase violence. Education moderated the effect of inequality on killing, while predominance of farmers and of Nepali speakers exacerbated it. We find evidence that more killings occurred in populous villages, lending support to the idea that violence was directed at expanding the Maoist franchise by demonstrating that opposition to the monarchy and elites in power was possible to achieve.