Prāsaṅgika Epistemology: A Reply to Stag tsang’s Charge Against Tsongkhapa’s Uses of Pramāṇa in Candrakīrti’s Philosophy

Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramā?a—authoritative cognition—is incompatible with the Prāsa?gika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramā?a (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)—authoritative cognition—within the Prāsa?gika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramā?a in the Prāsa?gika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsa?gika’s epistemology, and by showing that he emphatically denies any place for the foundationalist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the Prāsa?gika system, I will argue that Tsongkhapa’s epistemology emerges from Stag tsang’s criticisms unscathed.     

Prāsaṅgika’s Semantic Nominalism: Reality is Linguistic Concept

Buddhist semantic realists assert that reality is always non-linguistic, beyond the domain of conceptual thought. Anything that is conceptual and linguistic, they maintain, cannot be reality and therefore cannot function as reality. The Prāsaṅgika however rejects the realist theory and argues that all realities are purely linguistic—just names and concepts—and that only linguistic reality can have any causal function. This paper seeks to understand the Prāsaṅgika’s radical semantic nominalism and its philosophical justifications by comparing and contrasting it with the realistic semantic theories.     

Democratization by decree: the case of Bhutan

The small Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan is one of the most recent recruits to the world's democratic nations after more than a century of rule by the Wangchuck dynasty. The first national democratic elections were held in 2007 and 2008 and mark the formal transition from authoritarian rule, albeit of an enlightened nature, to democracy. But most conventional explanations of democratic transition are unconvincing when applied to the Bhutanese experience. This article reviews these explanations and demonstrates their lack of fit with structures and events in Bhutan. The two causal factors which do seem to explain the democratic transition are the strong state and transformational leadership. This is an unusual combination which not only challenges orthodoxy but also extends our understanding of the ways in which democratization can occur, a paradoxical way where, without any elite or popular pressure, monarchical powers are directed towards enabling democratization.