The other resource curse: extractives as development panacea

Since 2010, many African governments have challenged twenty years of extractive sector liberalization that has played a key role in unlocking mineral riches and attracting foreign direct investment. The potential for extractives to drive economic structural transformation is intuitively attractive, the Africa Mining Vision (2009) document providing a primary template. Geological inheritance alone, however, is not a panacea for economic development, industrialization or poverty alleviation. While much attention to the ‘resource curse’ has identified the problem of excessive rent-seeking and the consequent impact on elite consolidation, democracy, governance and macroeconomic distortions, a more fundamental problem, the ‘other resource curse’, may be an overlooked driver: a lingering assumption that mineral resources should straightforwardly provide significant revenue streams for public goods, inputs for industrial transformation, and extensive employment. Geology alone is neither conducive nor antithetical to economic development. Stakeholders require a more comprehensive understanding of the possibilities and limits of extractives in contemporary Africa.     

The use of error rates to predict and characterize the efficacy of presumptive field tests

From a forensic perspective, a presumptive test, one which indicates the presence or absence of a certain target material such as blood, is an invaluable tool. Among these tests, there are different specificities, sensitivities, and shelf lives. The accuracy of a test is an algebraic combination of the specificity and sensitivity of the test. Each test has limitations as given by its false positive and false negative rates. The aim of this study was to illustrate how the false positive and false negative rates are to be properly determined using a simulation study for the phenolphthalein test. New presumptive tests must be properly evaluated/validated through testing of commonly encountered household items and other potentially probative items usually found at crime scenes, however, the makeup of test sets must appropriately capture all error rates. In order to correctly use these results when the test is applied to an unknown sample recovered at a crime scene, the error rates cannot be applied directly to estimate whether or not the sample is actually the analyte of interest. In a validation study, the forensic scientist calculates the false positive rate as the p(Positive Reaction|Blood), whereas at the scene, the crime scene investigator wishes to determine the p(Blood|Positive Reaction). All crime scene investigators need to ensure that the conditional is not transposed when interpreting such results. Furthermore, this work provides a model for the assessment of a multiple test diagnostic system intended for investigators.     

Testamentary competency

This paper examines the development of the doctrine that restricts testation to competent persons, and the use of expert testimony in implementing that doctrine. Since 1870 the leading articulation of this doctrine has been Lord Cockburn's Rule, which among other things requires that the testator knew the natural objects of his bounty at the time the will was made. The facultative theory of mind underlying Lord Cockburn's Rule is consistent with the contemporary, functional approach to competency to make medical decisions taken by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. Where expert testimony, based on training in the behavioral sciences, takes a functional approach to discovering the nature of the testator's values regarding other persons, it can assist the trier of fact significantly more than the lay opinion testimony which many courts have preferred in questions of testamentary competency. The concern of commentators that courts make false attributions of testamentary competency out of a perceived need to protect the family would be lessened, and the freedom of testation promoted, if courts directed their attention, through the kind of expert testimony proposed, to the testator's psychological family, instead of the persons identified as family members in intestacy statutes.The author wishes to thank Professors John Monahan, Roberta A. Morris, and Richard J. Bonnie for their helpful critiques of an earlier draft of this paper. The author also gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Vicki L. Epling and Paul A. Lombardo, law students at the University of Virginia.A portion of this paper was presented by the author at the 1982 Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association under the title, The Application of Psychology to Legal Problems Involving Trusts and Estates, as part of the symposium, Psychological Questions in Legal Areas Largely Unexplored by Psychologists. This symposium was proposed and organized by Professor Gary B. Melton of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.