Developing Codes of Conduct: Regulatory Conversations as Means for Detecting Institutional Change

The introduction of a new corporate governance code in Sweden, modeled after prevailing Anglo-Saxon norms of corporate governance, offers the opportunity to investigate global regulatory convergence. Using the metaphor of regulatory space, this article analyzes the positions of the parties who submitted formal responses to the introduction of "The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance—A Proposal from the Code Group." While the globalization of financial markets might forecast unconditional acceptance of the proposed code by business and financial interests, the analysis of who made comments, and what was said, reveals three categorically distinct groups: Swedish business "insiders" connected to the existing institutional framework who opposed changes that would erode traditional division of functions, including collective responsibility for the actions of company boards; "outsiders" (i.e., foreign investors and more marginal Swedish investors) aligned with Anglo-Saxon internationalization of the markets who would change the system of corporate accountability; and the professions (i.e., auditors), who advocated for their professional interests. Of the three groups, Swedish business insiders were most successful in gaining support for their positions. Although international financial and political interests were key to the introduction of the Code in the first place, the article demonstrates how the dynamics of national (local) culture and power structures influence the transfer of regulatory law across jurisdictions.     

Regulation, deregulation and public bureaucracy

Abstract. In 1982, a new Liberal-Conservative government launched a grand deregulatory campaign as part of its programme for restoring the Danish economy. After some initial success, the campaign lost momentum. The government gradually realised that it was difficult to mobilise both economic interests and public opinion for the cause of deregulation. Bureaucratic resistance and disinterest among economic interest organisations together with the erosion of political commitment to deregulation after a couple of years stopped the campaign. Still, some results were reached where least expected.