Popularity functions based on the partisan theory

This paper presents popularity function estimates for U.S. presidents which are based on a model in which voters' evaluations reflect an understanding of partisan reputations for differing policies.I am indebted to J.C. Siebrand, F.A.A.M. van Winden and an anonymous referee for many useful suggestions.     

Homicide and economic change: Recent analyses of the Joint Economic Committee report of 1984

The relation between recession and homicide is classic in the United States. This has been affirmed in the 1976 and 1984 Reports to the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) of the United States Congress. Recent analysis confirms the findings reported in both 1976 and 1984 and demonstrates that the influence of recession on homicide is greater than previously estimated. Differences in the 1976 and 1984 findings on homicide are related to differences in the hypotheses tested, as discussed in detail and highlighted in the 1984 report. JEC staff correctly interpreted and reported the 1984 findings. Reproduction of the 1984 homicide equation is straightforward, provided the same data and any of several standard estimation techniques are used. Evidence does not support any of Cook and Zarkin's claims in their critique of the 1984 homicide equation. The JEC report of 1984 used appropriate techniques in the attempt (a) to ensure that influences attributed to economic changes are not actually due to other social factors and (b) to minimize underspecification of models.     

Gay rights activism: collection action frames,networks, and protesting among gays,lesbians, and bisexuals

While sexual minorities have produced large and efficacious social movements in many countries, there are few systematic studies on why gays and lesbians join these movements. To address this void, this study created a unique sample of activist and non-activist listservs to identify some factors that inspired greater involvement in protests for gay and lesbian equality (n?=?285). Through the use of binary logistic regression, this study highlights the importance of several contextual, framing, and demographic variables on the protesting actions of sexual minorities. In particular, the act of protesting for gay and lesbian rights was predicted by involvement in voluntary groups, the concealment of sexual orientations, a concern over institutionalized heterosexism, and the internalizing several sorts of activist identities. Finally, racial background, but not gender, age, or economic factors, was associated with attendance at gay and lesbian rights demonstrations.     

Sexual Identities and Protesting Among College Students: Exploring Political Distinctiveness Mediation Factors

This study examines the links between sexual identity and participation in political protests. Among a sample of college students (N?=?2175), we determined that sexual minority students were three times more likely to join a protest than heterosexual students. “Political distinctiveness” theories are used to explain this sexual identity gap in protesting. Following a series of path analyses, we conclude that marital status, exposure to discrimination (as a victim or observer), connections to LGB communities, participation in political groups, and liberal identities mediate the sexuality difference in protesting. Conversely, measures of educational attainment, exposure to multicultural classes, and internalized homophobia were not mediators.

     

Partisan views on the economy

In this paper it is argued that political parties may have incentives to adopt a partisan view on the working of the economic system. Our approach is based on a dynamical spatial voting model in which political parties are policy oriented. This model revolves around two interrelated issues x and y. The policy maker sets x directly. There exist two views on the relationship between x and y. Model uncertainty confronts policy makers with the problem of the selection of a model to base their actions on. We show that if voters have imperfect information about the working of the economic system that model selection contains a strategic element. Policy makers are inclined to adopt a view on the working of the economic system which fits in with their preferences. There is no inherent logic that places monetarists to the right of New Economists. They have different models of economic mechanism, but they need not have different political values. A conservative can be a Keynesian and a liberal a monetarist. These combinations are in fact surprisingly rare. James Tobin, 1974,The New Economics One Decade Older, p. 62.     

Mobile Capital, Democratic Institutions, and the Public Economy in Advanced Industrial Societies

This article addresses the following questions. Is international capital mobility systematically related to reductions in the size of the public economy, as globalization theory suggests? Alternatively, do democratic institutions and processes shape the ways in which internationalization affects national policies? Specifically, I argue that the effects of capital mobility on the scope of the public economy should be conditioned by the institutional forms of societal interest representation and the formal organization of decision-making authority within the polity. Utilizing econometric analysis of 1964–1993 data from 16 nations, I find that international capital mobility has few direct effects on the scope of the public economy. However, configurations of democratic institutions fundamentally shape the domestic policy impacts of capital mobility. Where social corporatism and inclusive electoral institutions are strong and where decision-making authority within the polity is concentrated, international capital mobility is either unrelated to the scope of the public economy or positively associated with total public spending, social transfers, and public consumption. In institutional contexts of pluralist interest and exclusive electoral representation, and in polities where decision-making is dispersed, rises in capital mobility are systematically associated with rollbacks of the public sector.     

Economic Outcomes and Voting Behaviour in a Multi-Party System: An Application to the Netherlands

This paper is an empirical study to the effects of economic outcomes on party choice for the Netherlands. In the first part of the paper we employ a multinomial logit model to examine the links between voters' characteristics and party choice. The results suggest that there are long-run movements in party choice which are unlikely be the result of changing economic outcomes. In the second part, we use time series analysis to determine the effects of economic conditions on short-run and medium-run movements in votes shares. The estimations results provide support for the responsibility hypothesis and for the predictions of the partisan voter model that left-wing (right-wing) parties benefit (suffer) from favourable economic growth prospects.     

Do elections lead to informed public decisions?

Democracies delegate substantial decision power to politicians. We analyse a model in which the electorate wants an office-motivated incumbent to design, examine and implement public policies. We show that voters can always encourage politicians to design projects. However, they cannot always induce politicians to examine projects. In fact, politicians who would examine policies without elections, say because of a concern about the public interest, may shy away from policy examination with elections.