Public support for pro-choice abortion policies in the nation and states: changes and stability after the Roe and Doe decisions

In 1973 the United States Supreme Court ruled that abortion could be had practically on request during the first 3 months of pregnancy. This article discusses whether the decision led to more public support for that position, and where in the U.S. the increase in support has been most drastic. The most recent public opinion polls indicate about 60% public support legalized abortion, while it was only 45% before 1973. Support has also increased even if pregnancy is not judged to be detrimental to the mother's health, or if it is not the result of rape and/or incest, but even if it is simply requested for economic or purely personal reasons. People under 30, with college education, men and Protestants, seem to be the staunchest supporters of abortion on demand. There has also been an increase in the number of Catholics supporting abortion. Support for abortion increased in most states between 1969-1973, particularly in the West and in the Northwest. The fight to deny federal funds for abortion is still raging in Congress; some studies indicate that the religion of the legislators is the most powerful predictor of voting on abortion, and that the decision is a very personal one, and not easily altered by the lobbying of groups on either side.     

Trade Winds: NAFTA and the Rational Public

The sharp increase in suppport for the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) poses a challenge to many of our conceptions of public opinion. Most large shifts in public opinion follow major events. Based on models estimated from the September to November NBC News/ Wall Street Journal surveys, I show this was not the case with respect to public opinion on NAFTA. Instead, the increase in support for the pact reflected a slower response to a public debate over the merits of free trade versus protectionism. As the debate proceeded, large segments of the public— including the least interested—developed more highly constrained belief systems. By the end of the public discourse, the most and least interested citizens both linked attitudes on the merits of trade to their positions on NAFTA and to their evaluations of the elites on each side of the issue. People made up their minds on NAFTA on the basis of arguments about trade, not about their own self-interest. The NAFTA case suggests that there may be a rational public at the individual level after all, even among people who may not usually be interested in public affairs.     

Trust as an alternative to risk

Many students of trust see it as a way to mitigate risk through the development of strong institutions that create trust. I offer an alternative view of trust, moralistic or generalized trust, that depends upon a psychological foundation of optimism and control. This form of trust, in contrast to arguments by Paldam and others, has “value” independent of experience. Using data from a survey of metropolitan Philadelphia in 1996, I show that if you believe that “most people can be trusted,” you are substantially more likely to see your neighborhood as safe at night even controlling for both the objective level of crime as well having been the victim of a crime, having had parents who were the victims of crime, watching local television news (which exposes people to violent events), where you live (central city and suburb), and gender. Trust thus “reduces” perceptions of risk independently of personal experience.     

If you can't please everyone,must you only please yourself?

Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742 8221, U.S.A. Shirking models, especially those of Kalt and Zupan, have demonstrated that Senators often vote contrary to their constituents' ideology. These models establish two components of Senators' ideology through a regression of constituency demographics on interest group ratings. The predicted scores are constituency attitudes while the residuals are Senators' personal ideologies. Senators' personal ideology is presumed to be independent of constituency factors. The use of demographics is problematic, because it is unclear that they are good surrogates for attitudes. Using statewide estimates of ideology from public opinion surveys, I show that demographics provide reasonable estimates of public attitudes. However, estimates of shirking from public opinion depend upon constituency characteristics, a finding that is inconsistent with shirking models based upon residualization. The existing shirking models depend heavily upon a legislator's party as a key component of constituency opinion. But party is an attribute of the Senator and not of the electorate. A better interpretation is that Senators respond to their fellow partisans in the electorate.     

Trust and growth

Using data from U.S. states, we find a positive relationship between trust and growth. According to our results, a 10 percentage point increase in trust increases the growth rate of GDP by 0.5 percentage points and the growth rate of manufacturing employment by 1.3 percentage points over a five-year period. Our results are robust to the endogeneity between trust and growth.